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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SUEDEEN G. KELLY* and DEBRA A. GILMORE**
1. INTRODUCTION
This survey of administrative law follows the pattern established by
its five predecessors.' The last survey of this area covered cases decided
through March 31, 1984.2 This article will cover significant appellate
cases decided from April 1, 1984, through January 31, 1988. The dis-
cussion attempts to fit each case into the framework of existing New
Mexico law and, where appropriate, to explain the value of the case in
the development of the law. Appellate cases decided during this time
period are organized into three major areas: the authority of agencies to
act, the exercise of administrative authority, and judicial review of agency
decisions.
There were significant developments in each area of administrative law
during the survey period. Under the first topic-authority of agencies to
act-the supreme court overruled thirty-year-old precedent and upheld
the constitutionality of the Workers' Compensation Commission.3 Also,
eight cases decided under the ultra vires doctrine provide insight into
how New Mexico courts approach the task of statutory construction when
an agency's interpretation of its statute is involved.4 The supreme court
also overruled precedent in a case under the second major topic--exercise
of administrative power-now holding that before a board can reject the
decision of its hearing officer, it must at least review enough of the
*Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law; J.D., Cornell Law School; B.A.,
University of Rochester. I wish to thank my research assistants Barbara Lah, Paul Bleicher, Maria
O'Brien and Brendan Mahoney for their help with this article. I also want to thank Michael Browde
and Robert Schwartz for their comments and suggestions. Finally, I am very grateful to Dean Theodore
Parnall for providing me a research grant to work on this article.
**Associate, Meyer, Hendricks, Victor, Osborn & Maledon, Phoenix, AZ; J.D., University of
New Mexico School of Law; B.A., University of New Mexico.
I. See Browde & Schultz, Administrative Law, 15 N.M.L. REV. 119 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
1983-84 Administrative Law Survey]; Kelly & O'Leary, Administrative Law, 14 N.M.L. REV. I
(1984) [hereinafter cited as 1982-83 Administrative Law Survey]; Shapiro & Jacobvitz, Administrative
Law, 13 N.M.L. REV. 235 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1981-82 Administrative Law Survey]; Browde,
Administrative Law, 12 N.M.L. REV. I (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1980-81 Administrative Law
Survey]; Browde, Administrative Law, I I N.M.L. REV. I (1979-80) [hereinafter cited as 1979-80
Administrative Law Survey].
2. 1983-84 Administrative Law Survey, supra note I, at 119 n.2.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 8-35.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 58-120.
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transcript of the proceedings to support its reversal.5 Under the final major
topic-judicial control of administrative power the court of appeals
decided a case of first impression in New Mexico, providing a guideline
for deciding where venue lies when the appeal involves multiple claims
governed by different venue statutes. 6
1I. AUTHORITY OF AGENCY TO ACT
A. Delegation of Powers
Administrative agencies are part of the executive branch of government
but nevertheless typically have both legislative and judicial powers. They
are routinely given authority to issue rules and regulations that have the
force of law (legislative power) and authority to decide cases (judicial
power). Since the constitution also grants legislative and judicial power
to the legislative and judicial branches respectively,7 the principle of
separation of powers demands that there be a limit on delegation of these
powers to executive agencies. One case decided during the survey period
addresses what that limit is and demonstrates that it is not marked with
a bright line. Another case involves the issue of delegation of legislative
power to private individuals, which violates constitutional due process
guarantees.
1. Delegation of Judicial Power
The' New Mexico Constitution provides that the judicial power of the
government shall reside in the judicial department. 8 In 1957, the New
Mexico Supreme Court, in Estate ex rel. Hovey Concrete Products Co.
v. Mechem,9 interpreted this provision to mean that while the legislature
could confer "quasi-judicial" .power on administrative agencies, it could
not delegate "judicial" power to them.'" In Mechem, the court defined
judicial power to include the determination of rights and liabilities be-
tween individuals. Mechem involved the constitutionality of a Workmen's
Compensation Commission." The majority of the supreme court found
the Commission unconstitutional because it had been given the authority
to decide a dispute between an employer and an employee-a "private
5. See infra text accompanying notes 256-62.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 387-96.
7. N.M. CONST. art. III, § I.
8. Id.
9. 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
10. Id. at 252, 316 P.2d at 1071.
I. Id. at 251, 316 P.2d at 1070. The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1957, 1957 N.M. Laws,
Ch. 246, § I, 1953 Comp. §§ 59-10-36 to -125, provided for a Workmen's Compensation Commission
to inter alia, decide disputes between employers and employees claiming Workmen's Compensation
benefits. The Commission's decision in each case would have the force and effect of law but would
be subject to the normal judicial review of administrative actions.
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dispute" within the sole jurisdiction of the judicial branch.' 2 The Mechem
case has stood for the proposition that, in New Mexico, administrative
agencies may adjudicate public but not private rights. 3
The public/private rights distinction first surfaced in federal law in
1855 in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. 4 It was
used in that case to uphold the constitutionality of judicial acts by the
Treasury Department in a case involving a United States customs collec-
tor. 5 The Court characterized "private rights" as those arising in common
law, in equity and in admiralty, and "public rights" as those which
Congress' created.' 6 The Court declared that while Congress could not
withdraw the adjudication of private rights from the jurisdiction of the
courts, Congress did not have to present public rights to the courts for
resolution. 7 The Court reasoned that since Congress has the discretion
to determine whether a remedy will be allowed at all in cases involving
public rights, Congress may prescribe how the remedy shall be made
available. 1'
Over the next 80 years, agency adjudications increased, as did ac-
ceptance by judges of the notion of administrative adjudications.1" In
1932, the Court expanded the scope of constitutional agency adjudica-
20tions. In Crowell v. Benson, it upheld the authority of an executive
agency to adjudicate disputes involving private rights. 2' Although the
12. 63 N.M. at 253-54, 316 P.2d at 1071-72. Justice Sadler wrote a vigorous dissent, in which
Justice Armijo concurred, criticizing the majority for making an unjustified distinction in the types
of judicial powers being exercised by administrative agencies. Id. at 255, 316 P.2d at 1072.
13. New Mexico was one of the few states to make the determination that administrative agencies
may adjudicate public but not private rights. In his dissenting opinion Sadler stated, "New Mexico
stands alone in the hierarchy of states holding the legislature lacks power to create an industrial
commission to hear and screen . . . cases [arising] under its workmen's compensation act." 63 N.M.
at 256, 316 P.2d at 1074.
14. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
15. The controversy in Murray's Lessee involved a U.S. customs collector; when the collector's
account was audited, a deficiency was found. As a result, the solicitor of the Treasury Department
issued a distress warrant, pursuant to federal law, ordering the collector's property to be sold to
make up the difference. Id. at 274-75.
16. Id. at 284.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Less e Through Crowell
to Schor, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 765, 787-89 (1986).
20. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
21. Id. The controversy in this case involved a compensation program to assist injured workers
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. Id. at 36. The Act created a
commission to review facts and issue orders awarding compensation. Id. at 42-45. Federal district
courts reviewed the cases on appeal, reversing only those holdings which contained errors of law
and gross inadequacies in findings of fact. Id. The issue was whether this scheme violated Article
III of the Constitution, particularly in light of the Court's holding in Murray's Lessee which seemed
to prohibit Congress from withdrawing from judicial cognizance any matter "which, from its nature,
is the subject of a suit . . . [in] admiralty." 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
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Court found the public/private rights distinction helpful in analyzing the
separation of powers problem, it did not find it determinative. In Crowell,
the Court viewed the agency chiefly as a finder of fact, while the courts
retained "full authority" to deal with matters of law upon judicial review
of agency action.22 The Court found that there was no constitutional
obstacle to this method of dispute resolution involving private rights.23
Instead, the Court saw it as relieving the courts' heavy workload while
preserving their "complete authority" to insure proper application of the
law. 24
Crowell marked the beginning of the demise of the "bright line" ap-
proach to determining the constitutionality of federal agency adjudications
based on whether a private or public right was involved.25 Although a
plurality of the Court relied on the public/private rights distinction as
recently as 1982,26 in 1985, in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products
Co., 27 the Supreme Court rejected the use of any bright line test. 28 Instead,
22. 285 U.S. at 46, 54.
23. Id. at 54.
24. Id.
25. One commentator has characterized Crowell's approach as a two-part analysis. The first
question is whether judicial involvement is required. If the function at issue involves "public rights,"
then there is no constitutional cause for concern. However, if the matter the agency is to decide
involves "private rights," then it is an act of which the judiciary has cognizance. This gives rise to
the second question: whether the agency adjudicator can fairly be seen as an "adjunct" of the courts.
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Incon-
sistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 504 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Formal and Functional Ap-
proaches].
26. In Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the Court, in a
plurality opinion authored by Justice Brennan, made the public/private distinction the most important
factor in determining that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violated Article III of the Constitution. The
Act created in each judicial district a bankruptcy court comprised of judges who served for 14 years
and were subject to removal and salary cuts. Id. at 54-55. The judges could entertain a wide variety
of claims related to the property at issue in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. These included state
claims, common law claims and federal law claims. Id. Justice Brennan viewed the matters the
bankruptcy courts were to decide as involving private rights and viewed the bankruptcy court as too
powerful and too unlike an Article III court to allow it to be looked upon as an "adjunct" to the
Article Ill courts. Id. at 70, 84-85; Formal and FunctionalApproaches, supra note 25, at 504. For
these reasons, the plurality found the Act unconstitutional. Id. The concurring Justices, Rehnquist
and O'Connor, found the Act unconstitutional because it allowed bankruptcy judges jurisdiction in
traditional state common law actions which were merely related to the bankruptcy determination.
458 U.S. at 90-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice White dissented, criticizing the plurality's
creation of "an artificial structure that itself lacks coherence." Id. at 94 (White, J., dissenting). He
also maintained that the public/private distinction had "received its death blow" in Crowell. Id. at
109.
27. 473 U.S. 568 (1985). This case involved a procedure of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), to work out the amount of compensation one industry was to pay to
another for providing data necessary to the other for compliance with the environmental regulations
of FIFRA. Id. at 573-75. The statute called for a federal arbitrator to determine the amount of
compensation if the parties could not reach agreement. Id. The decision of the arbitrator was subject
to judicial review only upon allegation of fraud and misconduct. Id. at 573-74. The petitioners
argued this provision violated Article Ill of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 576.
28. Id. at 586.
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it said, the inquiry should be on a case-by-case basis, the question being
whether the statutory scheme at issue allows Congress or the Executive
to impermissibly encroach upon the independent role of the judiciary.29
The Court reiterated this approach a year later in Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Schor ° where it looked to (1) the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated and (2) the concerns that pushed
Congress to have the right adjudicated outside the court system, in light
of the interest in maintaining an independent judicial branch. 3'
During the survey period in Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, the New Mexico
Supreme Court followed the federal lead and expressly overruled the
formalistic, private/public rights distinction announced in Mechem.32 Wy-
lie involved a challenge to the new Workers' Compensation Act which
provides for an administrative agency to adjudicate claims under the Act
between an employer and an employee.33 In a unanimous opinion, with
all justices participating, the court upheld the constitutionality of the law
and expressly overruled Mechem and its reasoning. The court adopted
the reasoning in Justice Sadler's dissent in Mechem, which rejected as
chimerical the attempted distinction between the Workmens' Compen-
sation Commission and other administrative commissions.34 The Wylie
29. 473 U.S. at 582-94. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority of six, said, "The enduring
lesson of Crowell is that practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal
categories should inform application of Article Ill." Id. at 587. The Thomas Court, however, still
maintained that the public/private rights distinction was relevant to the Article Ill question. Id. at
586-89. It informs the court whether the right which Congress has assigned to an agency to adjudicate
is one which has historically been confined to the courts for adjudication, thus aiding the court in
its attempt to comprehensively determine whether the congressional scheme for adjudication unduly
encroaches on the role of the courts. Id.
30. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). This case involved the question whether the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) had the power to assert jurisdiction over state common law counterclaims in
reparations proceedings. Id. at 835-36.
31. Id. at 853-60. Again, however, the Court made use of the public/private rights distinction,
pointing out that when a case involves a "private" right, it is a claim "of the kind assumed to be
at the 'core' of matters normally reserved to Article Ill courts." Id. at 853. While this is not
determinative of the decision, it informs the decision. Id.
32. 104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381 (1986).
33. After suffering through nearly 30 years of court administration of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, the legislature, in 1986, passed a proposed constitutional amendment to allow the creation
of an administrative agency to handle claims made under the Act. See id. at 752, 726 P.2d at 1382.
At the same time, the legislature passed a new law, this time called the Workers' Compensation Act,
which likewise divested the courts of jurisdiction over the law and created a Workers' Compensation
Division to administer the law. Wylie, 104 N.M. at 752, 726 P.2d at 1382. The Workers' Compensation
law became effective on May 21, 1986, 90 days after the 1986 legislature recessed. Id. However,
the proposed constitutional amendment could not become effective until it was passed by a majority
of New Mexico voters at the next general election in November 1986. N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § I.
In the interim, the Wylie lawsuit was filed asking the court to declare the new Workers' Compensation
law unconstitutional. Wylie, 104 N.M. at 751, 726 P.2d at 1381. The Wylie case was decided only
several days before the constitutional amendment was approved by New Mexico voters. Id.; N.M.
CONST. art. III, § I.
34. The Wylie court stated,
[W]e would take exception to the characterization in Mechem's majority opinion
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court also pointed out that Mechem's efforts to classify the Workmens'
Compensation Commission's adjudications as those of private rights ig-
nored the public stake in the adjudication of workers' remedies."
Although the court in Wylie rejected the public/private rights approach
to determining the constitutionality of adjudicatory power delegated to
administrative agencies, it did not leave us with an alternative standard.
Future decisions regarding the constitutionality of adjudicatory powers
delegated to state agencies might be informed by federal precedent and
thus might take a functional approach to this separation of powers issue.
2. Delegation of Legislative Power to Private Individuals
Legislatures may delegate legislative power to municipal and county
governments and to administrative agencies with appropriate and suffi-
ciently detailed standards.36 However, legislatures may not delegate leg-
islative power to private individuals.37 The U.S. Supreme Court forcefully
made this point in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.3" In that case the Court
struck down a provision of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935 which delegated the power to establish maximum hours and min-
imum wages for the coal mining industry to the major coal producers.39
The Court called the provision "legislative delegation in its most obnox-
ious form" and found it to be "an intolerable and unconstitutional inter-
ference with personal liberty and private property," in violation of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.4"
The doctrine prohibiting delegation of legislative power to private in-
of the [Workmen's Compensation] commission . . . as a 'clearly . . . judicial'
rather than 'quasi-judicial' body.... The distinction attempted simply does not
withstand examination of the two definitions ... [A] Workmen's Compensation
Commission is no more 'purely judicial'. . . than is New Mexico's Public Service
Commission, Environmental Improvement Board, Employment Security Depart-
ment ...
104 N.M. at 752, 726 P.2d at 1382 (citation omitted).
35. The Wylie court pointed out that the public's interest included minimum financial security
for the injured worker and his family and prevention of the worker becoming a public charge. Id.
36. 1980-81 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 1, at 2-3 n. 17.
37. 2 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11:21 (1969).
38. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). This was not the first time the Supreme Court found an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to private individuals. For example, in State of Washington ex rel.
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928), the Court found unconstitutional a Seattle
ordinance which permitted a philanthropic home for aged poor to be built in a residence district if
the owners of two-thirds of the property within four hundred feet of the proposed building consented.
Noting that the owners were free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and that the
Superintendent of Building of the City of Seattle was bound by their decision with no provision for
review by any administrative body, or otherwise, the Court held that the "delegation of power so
attempted is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 122.
39. 298 U.S. at 310-11.
40. Id. at 311.
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dividuals retains its vitality today.4' However, it does not prohibit leg-
islatures from allowing individuals to decide whether or when an existing
legislative policy should be applied to them. For example, in Currin v.
Wallace,4 2 the Supreme Court upheld a provision of the Tobacco Inspec-
tion Act of 1935 which conditioned the effectiveness of a regulation on
the approval of two-thirds of the affected tobacco growers. The Court
explained that this was not a case where Congress was abdicating its law-
making function.43 Congress could lawfully place a restriction on the
effectiveness of its own regulation.'
As Currin shows, legislatures may not delegate to private individuals
the right to make public policy but may allow private individuals to decide
whether a legislatively-decreed policy should be applied to them.45 Thus,
in any case involving an alleged unconstitutional delegation of power to
private individuals, the question is whether the purported delegation is
one of legislative power. If so, the delegation violates due process and
is void. Such a case arose in New Mexico during the survey period.
In Deer Mesa Corp. v. Los Tres Valles Special Zoning District Com-
mission,46 a developer sued a special zoning district commission and the
41. See, e.g., Gumbhir v. Kansas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 228 Kan. 579, 618 P.2d 837 (1980)
(Kansas Pharmacy Act provision permitting no one to take examination for registration as a pharmacist
or to be admitted by reciprocity if the person does not have an undergraduate degree from a U.S.
school accredited by the American Council on Pharmaceutical Education is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to a non-governmental agency).
42. 306 U.S. 1 (1939). See also Roberts v. City of Mesa, 158 Ariz. 42, 760 P.2d 1091 (1988)
(statute requiring that the owners of not less than one-half the value of the real and personal property
located in a proposed annexation area sign the petition for annexation is not an unlawful delegation
of legislative power to private individuals because the decision to annex is made by the city or
town's governing body at its discretion, not by the private individuals), and Minnesota v. Block,
660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (provision of the Boundary
Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act (I) allowing owners of resorts on certain lakes to require the
Federal Government to purchase their resort and (2) allowing owners of lands riparian to the lake
on which the government has purchased a resort to offer to sell their lands to the Government is not
a delegation of legislative power because Congress itself established the restrictions affecting the
property and merely gave the land owners the ability to choose whether to take advantage of them).
43. 306 U.S. at 15.-
44. Id. at 15-16.
45. The Court in Currin explained it thus:
Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to determine exactly when its ex-
ercise of the legislative power should become effective . . . and it may leave the
determination . . . to the . . .Executive, or, as often happens in matters of state
legislation, it may be left to a popular vote of . . .[those] to be affected by the
legislation. While in a sense one may say that such residents are exercising
legislative power, it is not an exact statement, because the power has already
been exercised legislatively by the body vested with that power under the Con-
stitution, the condition of its legislation going into effect being made dependent
by the legislature on the expression of the voters of a certain district..
Id. at 16 (quoting Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928)).
46. 103 N.M. 675, 712 P.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1985).
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board of county commissioners, challenging the constitutionality of the
Special Zoning District Act.47 The trial court ruled that the Act uncon-
stitutionally delegated power to private persons and allowed an arbitrary
exercise of power by individuals.48
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed.49 The statutory provision
at issue allowed the formation of a special zoning district upon the filing
of a petition signed by at least fifty-one percent of the registered electors
residing in the area to be designated.5" Under this statute, the area to be
designated had to be outside the boundaries of an incorporated munici-
pality and of any general zoning ordinance, and had to contain at least
one hundred and fifty single-family dwellings.5 ' However, the statute
provided no limitation on the amount of territory or the location of territory
which could be included in the district. The special zoning district was
to be created upon the filing of the petition with the clerks of the counties
affected, without any further action by any administrative agency or local
governing body.52
In deciding this case, the court of appeals asked the pertinent question:
whether the statute unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to pri-
vate individuals.53 In answering the question, however, the court engaged
in an unnecessary, and somewhat confusing, two-step process: the court
found, first, that the formation of a special zoning district was a legislative
act, and, second, that the legislature had provided no standard in this
statute to guide the private individuals in determining the size or location
of the district.54 The court thus concluded the statute was "void as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."55
It appears that the court confused the doctrine prohibiting delegation
of legislative power to private individuals with the doctrine prohibiting
47. Id. at 676, 712 P.2d at 22. The Special Zoning District Act was found at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 3-21-15 to -26 (Repl. Pamp. 1985). Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 683, 712 P.2d at 29.
50. Id. at 681-82, 712 P.2d at 27-28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-21-18 provided the following limi-
tations on location and size of the districts:
[Tihe district must be outside the boundary limits of an incorporated municipality,
there must be 150 single-family dwellings within the area of the proposed district,
fifty-one percent of the registered electors within the area of the proposed district
must sign a petition requesting a district, there must be no general zoning ordinance
applicable to the area of the proposed district and the district is not limited to one
county.
Deer Mesa, 103 N.M. at 681-82, 712 P.2d at 27-28.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 681, 712 P.2d at 27 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. §3-21-18)).
53. Id. at 680, 712 P.2d at 26.
54. Id. at 680-83, 712 P.2d at 26-29.
55. Id. at 683, 712 P.2d at 29.
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unduly broad delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies.56
Under the former doctrine, as discussed above, the inquiry is merely: did
the legislature attempt to delegate legislative power to private individuals?
In Deer Mesa, the legislature attempted to delegate to private individuals
the ability to make policy, i.e. to decide where a special zoning district
would be located and what its boundaries would look like.57 Thus, it was
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private individuals.
The Deer Mesa court came to this conclusion, but its analysis is confusing
and threatens to hamper the appropriate adjudication of similar issues in
the future.
B. Statutory Authority
The foundation for all administrative decision-making is the authority
conferred on an agency by law.58 Statutory authority may create an agen-
cy's power to act,59 or the state constitution may grant an agency specific
powers.' As earlier surveys have indicated, legislative grants of authority
are not always clear and, thus, legal challenges to agency action as ultra
vires-outside the scope of agency authority-are quite common.6' There
were eight cases during the survey period involving such challenges.
Although they add little new to the law of ultra vires,62 the cases do shed
considerable light on the often perplexing question of when the court will
defer to an agency's interpretation of its governing statute.
When courts review agency interpretations of statutory provisions, they
56. The court's seeming confusion is also underscored by its failure to announce anywhere in its
opinion the rule that delegation of legislative power to private individuals is void per se. This, of
course, contrasts with the doctrine, arising under separation of powers, which allows the legislature
to delegate legislative power to administrative agencies if it provides sufficiently detailed standards
to guide the agency in the exercise of its powers. For a discussion of the latter non-delegation
doctrine generally and its status in New Mexico law, see 1980-81 Administrative Law Survey, supra
note 1, at 2-8. The court's approach in Deer Mesa would make more sense if the statute had delegated
the decision on the ultimate formation of a special zoning district to an administrative agency. If it
were an administrative agency, rather than private individuals, that was going to determine the
location and boundaries of a district, it would be appropriate to ask whether the legislature had
provided adequate standards to enable a non-arbitrary decision to be made.
57. The court in Deer Mesa relied on the fact that the statute failed to provide for location and
boundaries to find a delegation of legislative power too broad and, therefore, unconstitutional. 103
N.M. at 681-83, 712 P.2d at 27-29. Instead, it should have relied on this fact to find the delegation
one of legislative power and, therefore, unconstitutional.
58. 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note I, at 2.
59. Id.
60. For example, the constitution gives fundamental authority to the Corporation Commission,
N.M. CONST. art. XI; the Commissioner of Public Lands, id. art. XIII, § 2; and the State Department
of Education, id. art. XII, § 6. 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note I, at 2 n.7.
61. 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 1, at 2.
62. For a discussion of the ultra vires doctrine, see 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra
note 1, at 2-5.
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have the discretion to decide the question of law independently63 or to
defer' to the agency's interpretation. In New Mexico, as well as in the
federal system, it has been impossible to predict how a court will exercise
its discretion in any given case.65 Courts do not hesitate to strike down
an agency interpretation they find to be contrary to legislative intent."6
Yet, they have yielded to an agency's interpretation if they deem it to be
reasonable.67 The factors which seem to influence courts to defer to
reasonable agency determinations include
[t]he character of the administrative agency, the nature of the prob-
lems with which it deals, the nature and consequences of the ad-
ministrative action, the confidence which the agency has won, the
degree to which the review would interfere with the agency's func-
tions or burden the courts, the nature of the proceedings before the
administrative agency, and similar factors.6"
Much of the ambiguity in this area of federal law was eliminated by
the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,69 where the Court announced
that "federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect
legitimate policy choices made by those who do." 7 In upholding the
63. Making an independent determination of the question of law would not preclude the court's
taking the agency's interpretation into consideration.
64. Deference, used in this context, means to yield to the agency's interpretation. It does not
mean to take the agency's interpretation into account. See supra note 1.
65. For a case where a court has deferred to the construction given the statute by the agency
charged with its administration see Bokum Resources Corp. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control
Comm'n, 93 N.M. 546, 603 P.2d 285 (1979), discussed in 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey,
supra note 1, at 4-5. For a case where a court has not deferred see Strebeck Properties, Inc. v. New
Mexico Bureau of Revenue, 93 N.M. 262, 599 P.2d 1059 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675,
593 P.2d 1078 (1979), cited in 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 1, at 5 n.25. For
years, commentators have debated whether any principle governs the federal courts' approach to a
review of agency decisions of law and, if so, what it is. See, e.g., S. BREYER & R. STEWART,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 285 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY], for a summary of three commentators' views. Professor Davis
has opined that a court's choice "usually depends on which way it wants to resolve the substantive
question." 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:16 at 403 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE]. The federal courts have substituted their interpretation for
that of the agency far more often than not. Id.
66. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 65, at 400, 403-04.
67. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), as discussed in ADMI-
NISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 65, § 29:16 at 400.
68. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 553 (3d ed. 1972) (citing Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm.
Ad. Proc. 91 (1941)).
69. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
70. Id. at 866. Chevron involved the construction given the statutory term "major stationary
source" by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Id. at 839-40. EPA interpreted this term
so as to allow the states to treat all units within an industrial complex as though they were within
a single "bubble" for purposes of meeting the requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977. Id. Adoption of this "bubble concept" allows the industrial complex to install or modify one
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Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) construction of a statute, the
Chevron Court declared that whenever the wisdom of an agency's policy
is at issue, the courts must defer to that policy if it is based on a reasonable
construction of the statute.7 ' With this, the Supreme Court clearly an-
nounced that federal courts are not to substitute their judgment on ques-
tions of policy for that of an agency, assuming the agency's is reasonable.
The Chevron Court explained that when questions involving statutory
interpretation arise on review of administrative decisions, the job of the
court is to give effect to congressional intent.72 Thus, if congressional
intent is clear on the face of the statute or ascertainable through the
traditional tools of statutory construction, the court's job is to enforce
that intent, regardless of the agency's interpretation of it.73 However, if
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, there
is no congressional intent to be implemented. In such cases, someone
else must formulate the policy to fill in the legislative gap. If the agency
has adopted a reasonable policy to fill this gap, the courts must uphold
it.74 The Chevron Court emphasized that a reasonable agency policy is
entitled to deference even if other policies could have been adopted and
even if the court would have chosen a different policy had it not been
faced with an agency choice already made.75 The Court did not provide
any rule to govern whether an agency policy is "reasonable" except to
say that it must be based on a permissible construction of the statute.76
In upholding EPA's construction of the statutory term "source" as rea-
sonable, the Court found that it "represents a reasonable accommodation
of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regu-
latory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter
in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling
conflicting policies." 7
7
The Chevron Court also clarified two other issues relating to the proper
piece of equipment without meeting permit requirements if the modification will not increase the
total emissions from the plant. Id. The Natural Resources Defense Council challenged EPA's inter-
pretation, arguing that the Clean Air Act required EPA to define major stationary source so as to
compel the industrial complex to comply with stringent permit requirements designed to significantly
reduce emissions whenever the complex modified or installed a piece of equipment. Id. at 859.
71. Id. at 843, 866.
72. Id. at 842-43.
73. Id. at 843 & n. 9.
74. This approach toward review of an agency's construction of the statute it administers has
been called the Chevron two-step approach. The first step is to determine whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If not, the question is whether the agency's con-
struction is reasonable. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,
287-88 (1986).
75. 467 U.S. at 843 n.l.
76. id. at 843.
77. Id. at 865 (footnotes omitted).
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role of the judiciary in reviewing agency decisions. First, it emphasized
that questions of law are to be decided independently by the judiciary.7"
Second, by characterizing the agency decision at issue as one of policy,
the Court implicitly defined questions of law narrowly, excluding many
which have been viewed historically as questions of law.79 The agency
decision on review in Chevron was one of pure statutory interpretation
which has usually been viewed as a question of law. However, Chevron
shows that issues of statutory interpretation are correctly viewed as ques-
tions of policy, not law, when classical methods of statutory interpretation
reveal Congress has not formed an intent on the precise question at issue.
In summary, Chevron has more clearly defined the sphere within which
the federal courts are required to substitute their judgment for that of an
administrative agency and the sphere within which they are restrained
from doing so.8° These courts are now to engage in judicial review of an
agency's construction of its statute by, first, determining whether Con-
gress has directly spoken to the question at issue. If so, Congress' intent
is to be implemented. If not, resolution of the issue is a question of policy,
and the agency's resolution is to be given effect if it is reasonable. Chevron
leaves unclear what is meant by "reasonable"'" but emphasizes that a
court's mere disagreement with the policy chosen by the agency is in-
sufficient to overturn it.
New Mexico courts have not announced any rule governing judicial
statutory interpretation in a case where an agency has already interpreted
its statute. Following is a discussion of the eight cases decided during
the survey period which involved challenges to an agency's action as
ultra vires and, of necessity, to the agency's interpretation of its statute.
78. "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Id. at 843 n.9.
79. For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see Pierce, Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial
Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 304-10 (1988).
80. The Chevron doctrine is not without its critics. See, e.g., Starr, Sunstein, Willard, Morrison
& Levin, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353
(1987) and Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986).
81. It may be that "reasonable" merely means not arbitrary and capricious. Or, it may be that
the courts will undertake a more searching evaluation using the factors that historically have influenced
courts to defer to agency policy determinations, see supra text accompanying notes 63-68. If the
latter is so, we know that at least one of these factors-the degree to which the review would
interfere with the agency's functions or burden the courts-has been rendered irrelevant by the
Chevron Court's finding that the agency is more competent institutionally than the courts to decide
questions of policy:
[Flederal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the
wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing
views of the public interest are not judicial ones: 'Our Constitution vests such
responsibilities in the political branches.'
467 U.S. at 866 (citation omitted).
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These cases provide an overview of the ad hoc basis on which New
Mexico courts have treated agency interpretations of law.
In New Mexico Pharmaceutical Association v. State,82 the court did not
defer to the agency's interpretation. In this case, the Association alleged
that a New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners rule allowing physician
assistants to dispense dangerous drugs in certain situations was invalid
because it conflicted with a statute defining the practice of medicine. 83
The Board, however, had interpreted the statute so that it did not conflict
with its rule.84
The court began its analysis of the case by finding that the meaning
of the statutory language was unclear and that it had to, therefore, "resort
to construction and interpretation in order to ascertain and give effect to
the intention of the Legislature." 85 This is the usual procedure for inter-
preting a statute. The goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature. The first step in determining legislative intent
is to look at the statute itself, giving the words their plain meaning. If
the statute is not clear on its face, the court must resort to other methods.
It is at this point, said the New Mexico Pharmaceutical court, that a court
should look to the statutory interpretation given by the agency.86 However,
82. 106 N.M. 73, 738 P.2d 1318 (1987).
83. Id. at 74, 738 P.2d at 1319. The rule allowed the Board to give written permission to a
supervising physician to delegate to a physician's assistant the authority to dispense certain drugs,
if the patient was located more than twelve miles from the nearest pharmacy open at the time of
dispensing. Id. The Pharmaceutical Association contended that N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-1-16(G) (Repl.
Pamp. 1986) prohibited physician assistants from dispensing dangerous drugs. Id. Section 61-6-
16(G) is set out infra note 84.
84. The Board interpreted the statute to mean that a physician could not permit any "qualified
person" to dispense dangerous drugs but that physicians' assistants could dispense them. 106 N.M.
at 75, 738 P.2d at 1320. The Pharmaceutical Association argued that the term "qualified person"
meant a physician's assistant who acts in accordance with the criteria of § 61-6-16(G)(I), (2), and
(3). Id. at 74-75, 738 P.2d at 1319-20. Section 61-6-16(G) provides that the statutes regarding
licensing the practice of medicine shall not apply to:
[Ainy act, task or function performed by a physician's assistant at the direction
of and under the supervision of a licensed physician, when:
(I) such assistant is certified by and annually registered with the board as one
qualified by training or experience to function as an assistant to a physician;
(2) such act, task or function is performed at the direction of and under the
supervision of a licensed physician in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the board; and
(3) the services of the physician's assistant are limited to assisting the physician
in the particular fields for which the assistant has been trained, certified and
registered; provided that this subsection shall not limit or prevent any physician
from delegating to a qualified person any acts, tasks or functions which are
otherwise permitted by law or established by custom, except the dispensing of
dangerous drugs.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-16(G) (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
85. 106 N.M. at 75, 738 P.2d at 1320. Since New Mexico does not have legislative history, its
courts must rely on rules of statutory construction.
86. Id.
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the court was quick to note that it was not yet ready to defer to the agency
interpretation; it merely found it to be persuasive authority..87
In this case, the court reviewed the statute as a whole and found that
it forbade delegation of the task of dispensing dangerous drugs to phy-
sician assistants.88 Thus, the court rejected the Board's interpretation of
its statute and found that the Board acted outside the scope of its authority
when it promulgated the rule allowing physicians to delegate the task of
dispensing dangerous drugs.89
New Mexico Pharmaceutical stands for the proposition that when faced
with interpretation of a statute administered by an agency, New Mexico
courts will independently attempt to interpret the statute. If the court finds
that the statute is clear on its face or that legislative intent can be inferred
from other methods of statutory interpretation, it will not defer to an
agency's interpretation of its statute. However, in attempting to divine
legislative intent, courts will consider the agency's interpretation. The
next case gives us a better idea of the circumstances in which a court
might defer to an agency interpretation of its law.
In Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. Public Service Commission,"
PNM challenged the Commission's disapproval of PNM's general di-
versification plan to restructure itself into a public utility holding company.
PNM argued that no statute gave the Commission the power to disapprove
a restructuring plan prior to completion of the restructuring but rather
that the Commission had only the power to issue remedial orders to rectify
any adverse impacts of a completed holding company restructuring. 9 At
issue was the meaning of Section 62-6-19 of the New Mexico Statutes.9 -
The court proceeded with statutory interpretation much as the court in
New Mexico Pharmaceutical did. The court first looked to the words of
the statute, attributing to them their plain meaning. 93 The court found
that the statute clearly allowed the Commission to investigate either the
87. Id. (citing City of Raton v. Vermejo Conservancy Dist., 101 N.M. 95, 99, 678 P.2d 1170,
1174 (1984)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 76, 738 P.2d at 1321.
90. 106 N.M. 622, 747 P.2d 917 (1987).
91. Id. at 623, 747 P.2d 918.
92. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. §62-6-19(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984) provides that:
In order to assure a reasonable and proper utility service at fair, just and reasonable
rates the Commission may investigate:
(2) Class II transactions or the resulting effect of such Class 11 transactions on
the financial performance of the public utility to determine whether such trans-
actions or such performance have an adverse and material effect on such services
and rates.
Section 62-3-3(K) defines Class II transactions as including "the formation ... of a . . . public
utility holding company by a public utility or its affiliated interest."
93. Public Serv. Co., 106 N.M. at 624, 747 P.2d at 919.
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utility's act of giving form or shape to the holding company or the resulting
effect of the holding company.94 This did not settle the question, however,
because finding that the Commission has the power to investigate the
formation of a holding company is not coequal with upholding the Com-
mission's rule that a utility cannot form a holding company without pre-
approval of the plan by the Commission. So the court looked to the Public
Utility Act95 as a whole to ascertain legislative intent.96 The court found
that the legislature gave the Commission the right to formulate the means
"reasonably necessary" to investigate any Class 1I transaction.97 The court
also found that the Commission had the power to do all things "necessary
and convenient in the exercise of its [duty to supervise public utilities]. "98
It found that the Commission's pre-approval requirement was reasonable,
and it explicitly deferred to the Commission's determination that it was
necessary to perform the investigatory task under Section 62-6-19.99
This case shows that the court will defer to a reasonable agency inter-
pretation in instances where the legislature has been silent on the issue
and has expressly delegated to the agency the power to decide the issue.
In short, in this case the court followed the usual rules of statutory
interpretation to conclude: (1) that the legislature had given the Com-
mission the authority to investigate the formation of utility holding com-
panies; (2) that the legislature was silent as to the means the Commission
should employ in carrying out this duty; and (3) that the legislature had
delegated to the Commission the power to formulate the means reasonably
necessary to carry out its investigations and to supervise public utilities.
Then the court deferred to the agency's interpretation of the statute as
allowing it to give prior approval to Class IL transactions as necessary.
Elliott v. New Mexico Real Estate Commission" is a case where the
New Mexico Supreme Court upheld an agency's interpretation of its
statutory jurisdiction in the face of an ambiguous statute but without ever
mentioning the doctrine of deference to an agency interpretation of law.
This case involved the appeal of the Commission's suspension of Elliott's
real estate broker's license for his actions in connection with the sale of
an interest in a New Mexico real estate contract.' 0 Elliott was to receive
a selling fee as a result of the sale. 12 Elliott argued that the Commission
had no jurisdiction over him in connection with the sale because the
94. Id.
95. Public Utilities Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§62-3-1 to -13-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
96. 106 N.M. at 625, 747 P.2d at 920.
97. Id. at 624-25, 747 P.2d at 919-20 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-19(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1984)).
98. Id. at 625, 747 P.2d at 920 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §62-6-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1984)).
99. Id.
100. 103 N.M. 273, 705 P.2d 679 (1985).
101. Id. at 274, 705 P.2d at 680.
102. Id.
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vendor's interest in a contract for the sale of realty is personalty, not real
estate.'03 The Commission has jurisdiction over real estate brokers. '"
Under the statute, "real estate broker" includes one who sells real estate
for a fee.' 5 The term "real estate" is defined to include "leaseholds and
other interests less than leaseholds. "106
The question in Elliott was whether the sale of an interest in a real
estate contract is a sale of real estate as defined by the statute. The majority
of the court answered affirmatively with the conclusory statement that
"[tihe district court found that Elliott is a real estate broker as defined
in Section 61-29-2(A) and that he represented himself as such and acted
in that capacity. "1°7 However, the dissent pointed out that the supreme
court has held that the vendor's interest in a contract for the sale of realty
is personalty under the doctrine of equitable conversion. 08 These holdings
throw some ambiguity into the resolution of the question whether Elliott
was acting as a real estate broker for purposes of applying the statute,
although the majority never acknowledged this."°9
The majority could have reached its conclusion logically by one of
two routes. Presumably it could have concluded, as a matter of statutory
construction, that the legislative intent was clearly to extend the juris-
diction of the Real Estate Commission to those persons who sell an interest
in real estate contracts for a selling fee. Alternatively, the court could
have concluded that legislative intent regarding this issue was unclear
and deferred to the agency's interpretation, assuming it was reasonable. 0
There were five other cases during the survey period which involved
the question whether agency action was ultra vires. In four of those cases
the court concluded that the question could be disposed of by looking at
103. Id. at 275-76, 705 P.2d at 681-82.
104. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-29-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
105. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-29-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
106. Id.
107. 103 N.M. at 275, 705 P.2d at 681.
108. Id. at 276, 705 P.2d at 682, (citing Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 93, N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199
(1979); Gregg v. Gardner, 73 N.M. 347, 388 P.2d 68 (1963)).
109. Indeed, it is unclear whether the majority even realized that it was interpreting a question
of law rather than a question of fact. The court answers the question by referring to the decision of
the district court which found that Elliott was a real estate broker as defined in Section 61-29-2(A)
and by concluding that "[u]nder these facts, there was substantial evidence to support the district
court's judgement [that the Commission had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter]."
103 N.M. at 275, 705 P.2d at 681. Needless to say, the issue of the Commission's jurisdiction over
Elliott is one of law, subject to independent review by the court, not one of fact subject to the
substantial evidence test. See infra note 306.
110. The dissent points out that although the Commission argued that there was a public policy
interest in regulating those who sell property interests, the court would not find this reasonable
because the jurisdiction of the Commission is clearly limited by the legislature to those who broker
or sell real estate and does not extend to those who sell property interests. 103 N.M. at 276, 705
P.2d at 682.
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the statute at issue which was clear on its face,"' and the court did not
mention deference to the agency's interpretation of its statute." 2 In the
fifth case, Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Corporation Commis-
I ll. In only one of these four cases, Grauerholtz v. New Mexico Labor and Indus. Comm'n,
104 N.M. 674, 726 P.2d 351 (1986), did the court reject the agency's assertion of its jurisdiction.
In that case, the Labor Commission determined that Grauerholtz, a subcontractor on a public works
project, was employing apprentices in excess of the joumeyman-to-apprentice ratio allowed in the
trade. Id. at 675, 726 P.2d at 352. The Commission determined that the journeymen were actually
performing the work of carpenters or laborers, which would entitle the journeymen to a higher wage.
Id. Therefore, the Commission ordered Grauerholtz to pay additional wages under the New Mexico
Public Works Minimum Wage Act. Id.; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4-10 to -17 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
On appeal, the district court reversed the decision of the Commission and ruled that the Commission
lacked the power under the Wage Act to order the payment of wages. 104 N.M. at 676, 726 P.2d
at 353. The New Mexico Supreme Court'noted that it would make sense to give the Commission
the power to order payment of wages but found that the legislature clearly limited the remedies
available to the Commission when it found a failure to pay prevailing minimum wage and that
ordering payment was not one of the remedies available. Id. The court found that "Section 13-4-
14 is free from ambiguity; therefore, there is no room for construction, and it is to be given effect
as written." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the Commission's actions were ultra vires-outside the
scope of its authority.
The other three cases, in which the courts upheld agency jurisdiction, are discussed infra note
112.
112. In three of these four cases, the courts sustained the agencies' assertion of jurisdiction,
finding that the statutes clearly authorized the agencies' involvement.
The court upheld the statutory authority of the State Property Tax Division (Division) to promulgate
regulations for claiming property tax exemptions in Cottonwood Gulch Foundation v. Gutierrez, 102
N.M. 667, 699 P.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1985). The Division regulations required entities seeking tax
exempt status to apply for and obtain a ruling from the Division recognizing the group's tax exempt
status. Id. at 669, 699 P.2d at 142. The Division Regulations in question were 36-7(B)(1):12 and
36-7(B)(1):13 (Rev. April 1983). Id. Cottonwood Gulch, a nonprofit educational group, failed to
apply for such an exemption, and the McKinley County Assessor denied Cottonwood's claim for
tax exempt status. Id. The McKinley County Valuation Protest Board upheld the Assessor's denial.
Id. at 668, 699 P.2d at 141. The Board conceded that the Foundation's claim of exemption would
warrant granting a property tax exemption, but the Foundation had failed to apply for a ruling
recognizing its ight to tax exemption status as an educational entity. Id. at 669, 699 P.2d at 142.
Cottonwood Gulch claimed the Division regulations impermissibly infringed upon the County
Assessor's statutory right to authorize a property tax exemption. Id. The court of appeals held that
the legislature expressly authorized the Division to adopt regulations governing the claiming of
property tax exemptions, id. at 670, 699 P.2d at 143; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-8.1 (Repl. Pamp.
1986), and that the challenged regulations reasonably fell within the parameters delegated by the
legislature, 102 N.M. at 670, 699 P.2d at 143.
In Gonzales v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New Mexico (In re Electrical Serv. in San Miguel County),
102 N.M. 529, 697 P.2d 948 (1985), local utility consumers appealed a Public Service Commission
(PSC) decision which approved a transfer agreement entered into between Public Service Co. of
New Mexico (PNM) and Mora-San Miguel Rural Electric Co-operative (Co-op). Id. at 530, 697
P.2d at 949. Plaintiffs contended that the PSC order was unlawful because it required Co-op to serve
some customers within the city limits of Las Vegas and conflicted with the New Mexico Rural
Electric Cooperative Act (REC). Id. at 531, 697 P.2d at 950. The court reviewed the REC, as well
as the Public Utility Act (PUA), N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-3-1 to -4.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984), and held
that in the event of a conflict between the language of the two acts, PUA would control. 102 N.M.
at 531, 697 P.2d at 950. In this case, the Commission was acting within its authority to prevent
-unnecessary duplication and economic waste' between utility companies, a primary objective of
PUA." Id.
In In re Generic Investigation Into Cable Television Serv.'s, 103 N.M. 345, 707 P.2d 1155 (1985),
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sion,"' 3 the court expressly rejected the Commission's interpretation of
its constitutional authority to regulate intrastate railways but, in doing
so, did not discuss the doctrine of deference to agency interpretations of
their governing statutes. In that case, the railroads challenged the Ccr-
poration Commission's rules requiring the use of manned cabooses on
certain trains and particular methods of reporting railroad accidents. 4
The Commission had relied on its constitutional authority to regulate
intrastate railways for safety purposes in promulgating these rules. "' The
Commission interpreted "intrastate railways" to mean "railroad opera-
tions within New Mexico."'"6 The Commission furnished no authority
for its interpretation, and the court explicitly rejected it, relying on the
"long-recognized meaning" of intrastate operations as those which occur
wholly within the boundaries of a single state. 7 Since the railways being
affected by the Commission's order traveled through other states, they
were not intrastate railways under the usual definition." 8 Therefore, the
court held the Commission had no authority to promulgate the rules. "'
Two principles regarding the treatment New Mexico courts will give
to an agency's interpretation of its governing statute emerge from these
cases. First, the courts will not defer to an agency interpretation of law
when the legislative intent behind the statute at issue is apparent. The
legislative intent might be clear on the face of the statute, or in looking
at the statute as a whole, or in resort to statutory construction. In the
latter case, the courts may consider the agency's construction of the
statute, but they will not defer to it. Second, the courts will, at least
sometimes, defer to an agency interpretation of law where the legislative
the issue was whether the Corporation Commission had the authority to regulate cable companies'
digital data transmission services. Id. at 347, 707 P.2d at 1157. The New Mexico Supreme Court
construed the New Mexico Constitution, id. at 348, 707 P.2d at 1158, and the New Mexico Tele-
communications Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§63-9A-I to -20 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (presently codified
in Cum. Supp. 1987), and determined that the Corporation Commission had the authority to regulate
intrastate digital high speed transmission services offered on a contract basis for compensation by
the cable companies. 102 N.M. at 353, 707 P.2d at 1163.
113. 105 N.M. 145, 730 P.2d 448 (1986).
114. The railroads challenged the Commission's Rules 2 and 3. Id. at 146, 730 P.2d at 449. Rule
2 required the use of manned cabooses on certain trains, including "through" trains exceeding 2000
feet in length. Id. Rule 3 required immediate telephonic reporting of certain accidents to the Com-
mission. Id. at 148, 730 P.2d at 451.
115. Id. at 146-47, 730 P.2d at 449-50. Article XI, section 7 of the New Mexico Constitution
grants the State Corporation Commission the "power . . . to make . . . just rules requiring the
supplying of cars and equipment for the use of shippers and passengers, and to require all intrastate
railways . . . to provide such reasonable safety appliances . . . as may be necessary and proper for
the safety of its employees and the public."
116. 105 N.M. at 148, 730 P.2d at 451.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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intent on an issue is unclear and the agency's interpretation is consistent
with the statute as a whole. It is unclear, but unlikely, that courts will
always defer to a reasonable agency interpretation in the face of ambig-
uous legislative intent. Deference will be more likely where it is clear
that the legislature intended to delegate such a "filling-in" of the statute
to the agency, as in the Public Service Co. of New Mexico case.' 2° De-
ferring to reasonable agency statutory interpretations in the face of vague
legislative intent reflects the courts' preference to leave policy-making
power with the agencies. The development of administrative law would
be better served, however, if the courts would explicitly explain what
weight they will give to agency interpretations when construing statutes.
III. EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
A. Gathering and Disseminating Information
The Inspection of Public Records Act ' gives citizens the right to
inspect public records, subject to several exceptions. '22 The New Mexico
Supreme Court has also added an exception not found in the statute. It
has held that, although there is a strong public policy in favor of disclo-
sure, when the countervailing public policy in favor of confidentiality is
stronger, disclosure will not be permitted.'23 During the survey period,
the court, in Ex rel. Barber v. McCotter, '24 made it clear that this court-
balancing of the conflicting public interests will occur only if the infor-
mation sought to be released does not otherwise come under a statutory
120. Discussed supra text accompanying notes 90-99.
121. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-1 to -3 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
122. The exceptions include:
A. records pertaining to physical or mental examinations and medical treatment
of persons confined to any institutions;
B. letters of reference concerning employment, licensing or permits;
C. letters or memorandums which are matters of opinion in personnel files or
students' cumulative files;
D. as provided by the Confidential Materials Act; and
E. as otherwise provided by law.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1987). It is unclear whether an agency could choose to
make public any of those records which the public does not have a right to inspect.
123. State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 797, 568 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1977). The
court clearly acknowledged that it was creating an exception not provided for in the legislation. Id.
However, it cited cases in other jurisdictions where courts had done the same thing and argued that
the "greater weight of authority" supported its action. Id. The court also noted that the legislature
had not defined "public records" as used in the Public Records Act and stated its intention to apply
a "rule of reason" in evaluating each disputed claim for release of records. Id. In determining
whether a countervailing public policy exists sufficient to prohibit disclosure, the courts will balance
the benefit to the public of granting inspection against the harm which might result, keeping in mind
that public policy generally favors the right of inspection of public records and documents. Id. at
798, 568 P.2d at 1244.
124. 106 N.M. 1, 738 P.2d 119 (1987).
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exemption. In short, if an agency refuses to release certain information
which the legislature has explicitly provided may be kept confidential,
the court will not second-guess the decision.
In Barber, five staff members of the Western New Mexico Corrections
Facility (WNMCF) tested positive for marijuana use after submitting to
urinalysis. '25 The Grants Daily Beacon (Beacon) published two stories
about the staff members, who were eventually terminated. '26 The Beacon
sought review of the personnel files at WNMCF pursuant to the Inspection
of Public Records Act to determine the identity of the five staff mem-
bers.' 27 McCotter, the Secretary of the New Mexico Corrections Depart-
ment, refused the request.'
28
On appeal,' 29 the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the decision of
the Secretary. The court relied on the decision in State ex rel. Newsome
v. Alarid.3 ° In Newsome, the court construed the statutory exception to
disclosure for "letters or memorandums which are matters of opinion in
personnel files"'' to include "documents concerning disciplinary ac-
tions. ",132
In Barber, release of the names of the former employees would amount
to public disclosure of disciplinary records in violation of the personnel
privilege as found in Newsome. "' The court thus found that although,
ordinarily, the names of public employees are available for inspection,
in this case they had to be withheld to preserve the statutory privilege.' 34
In doing so, the court rejected the Beacon's argument that the court
balance the public interest in releasing the names against the assertion of
confidentiality. ,'
B. Rules and Rulemaking
There are two basic functions of administrative agencies: rulemaking
125. Id. Officials at WNMCF required the night staff to submit to urinalysis after hearing rumors
of drug use among night shift employees. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1-2, 738 P.2d at 119-20.
129. After the Secretary refused the request, the Beacon sought a writ of mandamus. Id. at 2,
738 P.2d at 120. The district court granted a permanent writ. The Secretary appealed. Id.
130. Id.; State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236 (1977).
131. The Newsome court interpreted the state public records provision which was then codified
at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 71-5-1(c) (Supp. 1975). However, it reads the same as the provision in the
current Public Records Act. See supra note 122.
132. Newsome, 90 N.M. at 794, 568 P.2d at 1240.
133. Barber, 106 N.M. at 2, 738 P.2d at 120.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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and adjudication of disputes. '36 Rulemaking is the legislative-like function
agencies use to formulate rules and regulations establishing agency policy.'37
There were three cases during the survey period which dealt with rule-
making. Two cases concerned requirements for promulgating and re-
pealing regulations, while the third case involved allegedly vague language
of a regulation.
In State v. Grissom, 1' the trial court dismissed several criminal charges
against defendants arising out of the alleged violation of an emergency
regulation promulgated by the New Mexico Savings and Loan Supervi-
sor.'39 The court's dismissal was premised upon the alleged procedural
invalidity of the regulation and the Supervisor's failure to specifically
articulate in the regulation the factual basis for its promulgation."4°
The regulation at issue prohibited state savings and loan associations
from investing in time-shares or funding loans collateralized by time-
shares.' 4 ' The Savings and Loan Supervisor issued the regulation under
his emergency powers. '42 Five months later, he modified the regulation
to allow savings and loan associations to make loans secured by time-
shares under certain criteria. ' Prior to the issuance of the emergency
regulation, State Savings and Loan Association of Clovis, with whom
defendants were associated, had time-share collateral of $3 million, of
which $1 million had become delinquent. " Defendants were later charged
with violating the emergency regulation with intent to defraud. "'
Defendants made three arguments in support of their claim that the
emergency regulation was invalid. They contended that an emergency
did not actually exist at the time the regulation was adopted and that the
justification contained in the regulation was partially unsubstantiated."
136. 1980-81 Administrative Law Survey, supra note I, at 21 & n. 124.
137. 1983-84 Administrative Law Survey, supra note I, at 123-24.
138. 106 N.M. 555, 746 P.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1987).
139. Id. at 557, 746 P.2d at 663. Campbell, the New Mexico Savings and Loan supervisor,
promulgated Emergency Regulation 83-3, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 143-145. 106
N.M. at 557, 746 P.2d at 663. The charges against the defendants arose out of the transfer to a
Clovis savings and loan association of approximately $28 million dollars of negotiable instruments
from defendants and corporations in which defendants were officers. Id. The defendants were charged
with fraud, embezzlement, securities fraud, conspiracy, and racketeering. Id.
140. Id. at 558, 746 P.2d at 664.
141. Id. at 557-58, 746 P.2d at 663-64.
142. Id. at 557, 746 P.2d at 663. The emergency powers are specified in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-
10-83 (Repl. Pamp. 1986). The supervisor need not give notice or hearing prior to promulgating an
emergency rule; however, he must hold a hearing within ten days after the effective date of the rule.
Id.
143. 106 N.M. at 558, 746 P.2d at 664.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 559, 746 P.2d at 665.
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Further, relying on the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act, the
defendants claimed that the basis for the issuance of the regulation was
not adequately set forth in the regulation.' 47
The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected all three arguments, holding
that the record supported the conclusion that an emergency existed and
the facts set forth in the regulation provided a sufficient basis for its
issuance. '48 Moreover, the court correctly held that the Administrative
Procedures Act,'49 which required agency action to be set forth in writing
prior to the issuance of an emergency rule, did not apply to the Savings
and Loan Act. '50 Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing the charges
arising out of the alleged violation of the emergency rules.' 5
Although it appears that the Supervisor designed the emergency reg-
ulation specifically to curb what was, for years previous, a legal activity
by State Savings and Loan Association of Clovis and its officials, the
defendants made no argument that such action was arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or somehow estopped. The court of appeals cor-
rectly ruled against the arguments made in opposition to the procedure
the Supervisor followed when he issued the emergency regulation.
In Rivas v. Board of Cosmetologists,'52 the majority of a divided panel
of the New Mexico Supreme Court found that if an agency acts to void
one of its regulations for exceeding its statutory authority, the voidance
is to be treated as a "repeal" for purposes of the applicability of any
relevant administrative procedure law. In Rivas, the Cosmetology Board
(Board) denied New's application for a license to practice cosmetology
and suspended the ownership license of New's employer, Rivas, for
employing an unlicensed cosmetologist. ,' When New applied for her
cosmetology license, the Board had already "withdrawn" its Regulation
106, which would have granted New a license under reciprocity and
would have protected Rivas from a charge of having employed an unli-
censed cosmetologist. ' The Board had withdrawn this regulation on
147. Id.
148. Id. After the emergency regulation was issued, the supervisor held a hearing on the regulation
within the ten day period required under the Savings and Loan Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-10-83
(Repl. Pamp. 1986). 106 N.M. at 558, 746 P.2d at 664. The supervisor adopted findings of fact,
determining that an emergency existed and that there were serious financial problems involving
timeshare loans which provided a sufficient basis for the regulation's issuance. Id.
149. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-8-1 to -25 (1978).
150. Grissom, 106 N.M. at 559, 746 P.2d at 665. The Administrative Procedures Act only applies
to those agencies specifically placed under it. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-2(A) (1978). The Regulation
and Licensing Department, of which the Supervisor is an official, has not been placed under the
Act.
151. 106 N.M. at 560, 746 P.2d at 666.
152. 101 N.M. 592, 686 P.2d 934 (1984).
153. Id. at 593, 686 P.2d at 935.
154. Id.
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advice of counsel that it exceeded the Board's statutory authority gov-
erning reciprocity.155 The Board followed no rulemaking-type procedure
in withdrawing Regulation 106.
The issue on appeal was whether the action of the Board in withdrawing
the rule complied with statutory procedure. '56 The majority found that
the Board engaged in rulemaking when it attempted to void its regula-
tion. '57 The court characterized the withdrawal as a "repeal", thus making
the agency's action subject to any applicable statutory procedure for repeal
of rules. '58 The court held that the Board failed to file the repeal with the
State Records Administrator as required by the State Rules Act.'59 The
Board's repeal of the rule was thus invalid, and the Board's actions
regarding New and Rivas were unlawful." 6 Justice Stowers, in his dis-
senting opinion, argued that Regulation 106 did exceed the Board's sta-
tutory authority.' 6' He therefore found that the Board acted properly in
treating Regulation 106 as void. 62
The majority's findings are the better reasoned. Treating an agency's
attempt to void an existing regulation as a repeal makes the repeal subject
to the administrative procedures that were attendant to the issuance of
the now-offensive regulation. This properly subjects the agency's new
interpretation of its governing statute to the same procedure the agency
followed in arriving at its original construction of the law. Indeed, persons
who are relying on the existing regulation are arguably more entitled to
the statutory rulemaking procedures, i.e. notice and comment, for an
impending repeal, than are persons who would be affected by a new
regulation. Additionally, it makes no sense to require an agency to follow
rulemaking procedures when it repeals a rule because of a new policy,
but not to follow any procedure when, as in Rivas, it repeals a rule
because of a new statutory interpretation. In short, the majority was
155. Id. at 595, 686 P.2d at 937 (Stowers, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 593, 686 P.2d at 935. The rulemaking amendments to the Uniform Licensing Act,
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-1-1 to -33 (Repl. Pamp. 1986), extend all required procedures to the repeal
of regulations. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. For example, the rulemaking procedures in the Uniform Licensing Act, N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§61-1-1 to -31 (Repl. Pamp. 1986), apply to repeal of rules by the Board, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 61-1-29(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1986); and the State Rules Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-3-24, 14-3-25,
14-4-1 to -9 (1978 and Cum. Supp. 1987), likewise applies. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-2 (A), (C)
(1978).
159. 101 N.M. at 594, 686 P.2d at 936 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-5 (1978)). In dicta, the
court also discussed several requirements of the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act for
repeal of regulations. Id. at 593-94, 686 P.2d at 935-36. The dissent correctly pointed out that
reliance on these provisions is in error since the Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to
this agency. Id. at 594-95, 686 P.2d at 936-37. See supra note 150.
160. 101 N.M. at 594, 686 P.2d at 936.
161. Id. at 595, 686 P.2d at 937. The majority did not reach this issue.
162. Id.
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correct in opposing the dissent's desire to, in effect, adopt a new category
of administrative action-voidance of a rule-subject to no procedural
constraints.
In Climax Chemical Co. v. New Mexico Environmental Improvement
Board,'63 the court of appeals relied on. a standard favoring the upholding
of broadly written regulations to reject a void-for-vagueness challenge to
environmental regulations. This case concerned an appeal of the revised
Liquid Waste Disposal regulations promulgated by the Environmental
Improvement Board (Board).'" Climax claimed the provisions were un-
constitutionally vague because they gave inadequate notice of the re-
quirements for compliance, thus permitting arbitrary application. 6 '
Following the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court to similar cases
involving a vagueness challenge, the court held that the complainant has
the burden of showing that the law is impermissibly vague in all its
applications in order to succeed on the claim. " In light of this, the court
found that even though some terms were less than clear, the challenged
regulations were not vague in all their applications. '67 In upholding the
constitutionality of the regulations, the court emphasized that in the field
of environmental protection, it is necessary for agencies to issue general
standards to serve this developing discipline, rather than devising un-
workably strict regulations.' 68
The decision in this case is consistent with the New Mexico courts'
tradition of upholding environmental regulations in the face of vagueness
challenges. '69 The courts continue to agree that the agencies' need for
163. 106 N.M. 14, 738 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1987).
164. "The regulations require a person to obtain a permit issued by the Division before installing
a new liquid waste system or modifying an existing one." Id. at 15, 738 P.2d at 133. Once an
applicant files for a permit, the Division is required to grant or deny the permit within ten working
days of receipt of the application. Id. The regulations also provide specific requirements as to lot
size, setback and clearance. Id.
165. Climax objected to the following provision of the regulation:
D. If the division finds that specific requirements in addition to or more strin-
gent than those provided in [a later section of the regulation] . . . are necessary
to prevent a hazard to public health or the degradation of a body of water, the
division may issue a permit conditioned on those more stringent or additional
specific requirements.
Id. (emphasis added). Climax specifically objected to the term "in addition to or more stringent
than" and "necessary to prevent a hazard to public health." Id. at 16, 738 P.2d at 134. Climax also
challenged the term "under such conditions" which was included in the definition of public hazard
in § 1-102(R): "the indicated presence in water or soil of parasite, bacterial, viral, chemical or other
agents under such conditions that they may adversely impact human health[.]" Id. (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 17, 738 P.2d at 135 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982)) (emphasis added).
167. Id. The court found that the terms "more stringent" and "degradation of a body of water"
provided clear and specific guidelines. Although the terms "additional" and "hazard to public health"
were less clear, they were not fatal to the regulations. Id.
168. Id. at 18, 738 P.2d at 136.
169. The New Mexico courts, with one exception, have rejected vagueness challenges to envi-
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some flexibility to achieve environmental protection is greater than the
regulated entity's need for absolute certainty.17
C. Orders and Adjudications
Adjudications involving a liberty or property interest require agencies
to give parties procedural due process. 7 ' The right of procedural due
process includes the right to "timely" notice and the opportunity to be
heard.' 72 The notice must also include adequate information about "pro-
cedural rights afforded and the substantive issues involved. "1 73
There was only one case during the survey period that dealt with the
issue of whether notice of a hearing afforded due process. In In re Elec-
trical Service in San Miguel County,'74 the appellants, two electric cus-
tomers, claimed that the notice given them about a Public Service
Commission (PSC) hearing was inadequate under PSC rules. '75 The hear-
ing officer's procedural order modified the PSC rule regarding notice,' 76
and the appellants received thirty-eight days' notice of the hearing date.
The court found that the hearing examiner was entitled to change the
notice period provided for in the rules'77 and that the due process re-
quirements, 78 reasonable notice and an opportunity tobe heard, had been
met. 179
ronmental regulations. Claassen, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine Applied to Environmental Reg-
ulation in New Mexico (1988) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Claassen.] The exception
was a toxic pollutant regulation found unconstitutionally vague in Bokum Resources Corp. v. New
Mexico Water Quality Control Comm'n, 93 N.M. 546, 603 P.2d 285 (1979). This case, as well as
the other cases in New Mexico involving environmental regulations challenged as being unconsti-
tutionally vague, are discussed in Claassen.
170. For a discussion of the tension between the vagueness doctrine and the need for flexibility
in the environmental regulatory context, see Claassen, supra note 169.
171. 1983-84 Administrative Law Survey. supra note 1, at 128.
172. Id.; see also Jones v. New Mexico State Racing Comm'n, 100 N.M. 434, 671 P.2d 1145
(1983).
173. 1983-84 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 1, at 128, text accompanying n.55.
174. 102 N.M. 529, 697 P.2d 948 (1985). For a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra
note 112.
175. Id. at 532, 697 P.2d at 951. The plaintiffs alleged that the utility should have given notice
in accordance with Rule 8-4 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the PSC. Id.
176. Rule 8-4 requires that notice of a rate change must be given no later than during the last
full billing cycle prior to the first scheduled hearing on the increase. Rule 8-4 N.M.P.S.C. Second
Revised Gen. Order No. 1 (1978). In the present case, the hearing examiner issued a procedural
order on August 8, 1983, scheduling the public hearing for September 15, 1983. 102 N.M. at 531,
697 P.2d at 950. The court did not say how much additional notice would have been required if
Rule 8-4 had been followed.
177. 102 N.M. at 532, 697 P.2d at 951. PNM had even exceeded the requirements of the procedural
order by hand-delivering notice to 12 of the 14 customers affected, including the appellants. Id. at
532-33, 697 P.2d at 951-52.
178. The court did not say it was deciding a constitutional issue, but it necessarily did so since
it had previously disposed of the statutory notice claim. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
179. Plaintiffs were allowed to intervene even though they failed to file a timely petition, and
they were able to question witnesses at the hearing and present their views. 106 N.M. at 533, 697
P.2d at 952.
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D. Process of Proof
A concern of litigants at the hearing stage of a proceeding is the process
by which the record is formed, upon which a final administrative decision
will rest.' ° There were two cases during the survey period concerning
evidentiary requirements at adjudicatory hearings. These cases are fact-
specific and present no new legal principles regarding process of proof.
In Varoz v. New Mexico Board of Podiatry, 8' the Board of Podiatry
(Board) revoked Varoz's podiatrist license based on Varoz's criminal
conviction on several counts of Medicare fraud. 8 ' At the hearing before
the Board, Dr. Varoz presented evidence that was not presented during
his criminal trial. '83 This additional evidence was relevant to one of the
eight fraud counts on which he was convicted.' 84 Dr. Varoz claimed that
the Board erred in basing its decision to revoke his license on his con-
viction on that count. '85 The New Mexico Supreme Court held, however,
that Varoz's other criminal convictions also provided an adequate basis
for revocation and the Board's decision, which rested on all the convic-
tions, could stand.'
86
In Stephens v. Motor Vehicle Division,'87 the New Mexico Motor Ve-
hicle Department (MVD) revoked Stephens' driver's license after the
agency found that Stephens was driving while intoxicated.' 8 8 Section 66-
8-11 (C) of the Motor Vehicle Code'89 gives the MVD director the power
to revoke a driver's license if certain requirements are met, including
receipt of a notarized statement from a police officer stating the officer
had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was intoxicated."' ° In Ste-
phens, the arresting officer's statement was not notarized, but the police
officer testified under oath at the MVD hearing about the incident. "'
The district court held that "the fact that the original statement was
180. 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note I, at 13.
181. 104 N.M. 454, 722 P.2d 1176 (1986).
182. Id. at 454-55, 722 P.2d at 1176-77. Dr. Varoz was convicted in federal district court on
eight counts of Medicare fraud. Id. at 454, 722 P.2d at 1176. The Board then revoked Dr. Varoz's
license. Id. at 455, 722 P.2d at 1177. After the Santa Fe District Court affirmed the Board's decision,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed five of Varoz's convictions. Id.
183. Id. at 458, 722 P.2d at 1180.
184. One of Dr. Varoz's convictions involved a Medicare claim for a surgery which allegedly
had never been performed. Id. at 455, 722 P.2d at 1177. At the Board hearing, Varoz presented
evidence, including the videotaped testimony of the patient, that the surgery in question actually
was performed. Id. at 458, 722 P.2d at 1180.
185. Id. at 458, 722 P.2d at 1180.
186. Id.
187. 106 N.M. 198, 740 P.2d 1182 (Ct. App. 1987).
188. Id.
189. N.M. STAT. ANN. §66-8-111(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
190. 106 N.M. at 198, 740 P.2d at 1182.
191. ld. at 198-99, 740 P.2d at 1182-83.
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not under oath was cured by the subsequent testimony of both officers
under oath at the hearing, so the possibility of prejudice to the Petitioner
was removed." '92 Stephens argued on appeal that because the officer failed
to notarize the statement, MVD did not have authority to revoke her
license.'93 The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the district court, finding that the requirement of a sworn statement was
both mandatory and jurisdictional.' 94 Without a sworn statement, MVD
lacked jurisdiction to institute revocation proceedings.
E. The Decisionmaking Process
Many aspects of the decision-making process were litigated during the
survey period. While not all the cases are discussed at length, this Article
will discuss the most significant cases dealing with 1) timeliness of the
hearing, 2) the importance of an impartial decisionmaker, 3) the standard
of proof, 4) the discovery process, 5) a statement of reasons for the
decision, 6) rejection of the decision of the hearing officer, and 7) sub-
sequent proceedings on the same grounds.
1. Timeliness of the Agency Hearing and Final Order
During this survey period the courts strictly interpreted statutory pro-
visions limiting the time within which agencies can hold hearings and
issue final orders. In two cases, the court of appeals stressed the impor-
tance of the procedural protection of a speedy hearing for teachers who
appeal their dismissals. A supreme court case strictly construed the time
within which an agency decision must be rendered and signed under the
Uniform Licensing Act.
The first of two cases involving the timeliness of a hearing on a teacher's
termination was Redman v. Board of Regents of New Mexico School for
Visually Handicapped. 9 5 Redman concerned an appeal hearing before the
State Board of Education.'96 The applicable statute provided that the
192. Id. at 199, 740 P.2d at 1183.
193. Id. Stephens argued that the requirement of § 66-8-111(C) was mandatory. Id. MVD, on
the other hand, argued that the statutory provision for a sworn statement was directory, rather than
mandatory. Id. Even if the requirement were mandatory, MVD alleged that the requirement could
be avoided in the absence of prejudice. Id.
194. Id. at 201, 740 P.2d at 1185.
195. 102 N.M. 234, 693 P.2d 1266 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 102 N.M. 225, 693 P.2d 591
(1985).
196. The Superintendent of the New Mexico School for the Visually Handicapped (NMSVH)
dismissed Redman after determining that she authored four letters making false accusations of
misconduct by NMSVH officials. Id. at 236, 693 P.2d at 1268. After a hearing, the Board of Regents
upheld the dismissal. Id. Redman appealed to the State Board. Id.
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hearing "shall be" held within sixty days of the notice of appeal.' 7 The
teacher is to receive a decision within 120 days of the notice.' 8 In this
case, Redman's hearing began the sixty-sixth day after the notice of
appeal, and the decision was received more than 120 days after the
notice. ' The court held that the statute imposed a mandatory requirement
that the Board hold the hearing within the prescribed time. 2°° The court
explained that this mandatory requirement provided important protections
to tenured teachers, as well as to the schools and their students. 20 ' The
court did find that the right to a timely hearing could be waived, although
it was not waived in this case.2°2
A year later, the court of appeals applied its holding in Redman to
Board of Education of Taos Municipal Schools v. Singleton. 203 Singleton
involved the timeliness of the initial hearing held by a local school board
after a notice of termination. 2' Citing Redman, the court ruled that the
time specified in the statute for conducting a dismissal hearing is man-
datory,05 unless waived by the parties or unless a continuance is sought
197. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-20(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1984). Section 22-10-20(D) was repealed
after Redman and comparable provisions are found at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-10-14 to -14.1 (Repl.
Pamp. 1986). The general principles established by Redman, however, would apply as well to the
new statutory provisions.
198. N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-10-20(l) (Repl. Pamp. 1984) (repealed by 1985 N.M. Laws, Ch.
33 § 33).
199. Redman, 102 N.M. at 236, 239, 693 P.2d at 1268, 1271. A hearing was originally scheduled
within 60 days of the notice of appeal. The hearing was rescheduled, however.
200. Id. at 238, 693 P.2d at 1270.
201. The court found that expeditious review protects teachers from "arbitrary and capricious
delay" and from monetary injury. Id. at 239, 693 P.2d at 1271.
202. Id. A State Board regulation stated that the time limits for a heating could be waived by
the parties in writing. Id. The State Board found that the parties had waived the time limits during
an unrecorded and untranscribed conference call between the hearing officer and the attorneys, but
the court held this oral consent did not satisfy the regulation requiring a written waiver. Id.
203. 103 N.M. 722, 712 P.2d 1384 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 740, 713 P.2d 556
(1986).
204. The Taos School Board discharged Singleton after the district superintendent informed the
Board that Singleton lacked recertification of her teaching certificate. Id. at 724, 712 P.2d at 1386.
The Board took the position that it did not hqve to give Singleton notice and a hearing on her
dismissal. Id. at 727, 712 P.2d at 1389. The Board ultimately lost this argument in the New Mexico
Supreme Court. Id. Thus, the Board did not give Singleton a hearing on her discharge until two
years after the date of her discharge. Id. at 725, 712 P.2d at 1387. The applicable statute, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-10-17 (Repl. Pamp. 1984), required the local board to conduct a hearing on the
dismissal not more than 15 days from the date of service of the notice of discharge. Id. at 727, 712
P.2d at 1389.
In 1986, Section 22-10-17 was completely rewritten. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-17 (Repl.
Pamp. 1986). The section still provides, however, that a teacher may request a hearing within five
days from the date the termination notice is served, and the school board must hold the hearing
within ten days after receiving the teacher's request. Id. § 22-10-17(B)-(C).
205. The applicable statute reads as follows:
A local school board may discharge certified school personnel . . . only
according to the following procedure:
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and obtained for good cause. 2" In this case, the Taos Board had made
no showing of good cause for delay in giving Singleton a hearing.2 7
In Foster v. Board of Dentistry of New Mexico °. the supreme court
held that the Board lost jurisdiction over Foster because it failed to comply
with the statutory deadline for rendering and signing a decision suspending
Foster's dental license for fourteen days. 2" Section 61-1-13(B) of the
Uniform Licensing Act states that the Board must render and sign any
decision based on a hearing within ninety days after the hearing.2"' Section
61-1-14 of the Act provides that the Board must serve the applicant or
licensee with the decision within fifteen days after it is rendered and
signed."' In this case, the Board rendered and signed its decision ninety-
five days after the completion of the hearing.2"2 The Board served its
decision on Foster two days later.2"3 On appeal, Foster argued that the
ninety-day requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. '4 The Board
contended that the requirement was merely procedural and Foster was
not prejudiced by the violation since he received a final decision within
ninety-seven days of the completion of his hearing.2"5 The supreme court
agreed with Foster. Without elaboration, it found that the words of Section
61-1-13(B) are clearly mandatory.21 6 Since the Board failed to comply
with the ninety day provision, the court ruled its decision void.2"7
B. stating in the notice of discharge the following:
(2) a place within the school district or state agency and a date not
less than five days nor more than fifteen days from the date of
service of the notice of discharge for a hearing before the local
school board or the governing authority of the state agency[.]
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-17 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
206. Singleton, 103 N.M. at 728, 712 P.2d at 1390.
207. Id.
208. 103 N.M. 776, 714 P.2d 580 (1986).
209. Id. at 777, 714 P.2d at 581.
210. N.M. STAT. ANN. §61-1-13(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1986) provides in pertinent part:
A decision based on the hearing shall be made by a quorum of the board and
signed by the person designated by the board within sixty days after the com-
pletion of the preparation of the record or submission of a hearing officer's
report, whichever is later. In any case the decision must be rendered and signed
within ninety days after the hearing.
211. N.M. STAT. ANN. §61-1-14 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
212. Foster, 103 N.M. at 776, 714 P.2d at 580.
213. Id. at 777, 714 P.2d at 581.
214. Id. at 776, 714 P.2d at 580.
215. Id. at 777, 714 P.2d at 581.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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2. Impartial Decisionmaker
It is a requirement of due process in any adjudicatory administrative
proceeding that the decisionmaker be impartial. 2 8 Board of Education of
Melrose Municipal Schools v. New Mexico State Board of Education219
involved an allegation of bias on the part of the decisionmaker.22 ° In that
case, a hearing officer appointed by the State Board upheld the Local
Board's decision to discharge a teacher. 22' Before the State Board voted
on the hearing officer's findings, the Board was subjected to a "blizzard
of oral and written communications" from the Melrose community, most
of which supported the teacher.2 22 The State Board rejected the hearing
officer's findings and found that the Local Board did not establish that
cause existed for the teacher's discharge.223 In making this finding, the
State Board looked at neither the transcript of the Local Board's hearing
nor that of its own hearing officer's hearing.224
The Melrose School Board appealed and argued that the State Board
decision should be reversed because, inter alia, the State Board members
had received ex parte communications from the Melrose community. 25
While the court did not decide the case based on this issue, 26 the court
was concerned enough about the appearance of bias to feel "compelled
to comment. 27 The court emphasized that when a board operates in a
quasi-judicial manner (as a fact finder in an adjudicatory hearing), the
board must be cautious to protect itself from contacts which could interfere
with its adjudicatory responsibilities.228
218. 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 1, at 15.
219. 106 N.M. 129, 740 P.2d 123 (Ct. App. 1987).
220. One other case decided during the survey period involving the possible bias of the deci-
sionmaker was Varoz v. New Mexico Bd. of Podiatry, 104 N.M. 454, 722 P.2d 1176 (1986),
discussed supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text. Dr. Varoz claimed bias because the Board
chairman had previously reviewed for Medicare payment the claims with which Varoz's various
convictions were concerned. Varoz, 104 N.M. at 458, 722 P.2d at 1180. The court, however, held
that Varoz had not preserved the issue for appeal. Id. Varoz did not directly question the Chairman
about his prior participation, failed tomove to disqualify the Chairman, and did not raise the issue
in his petition for judicial review. Id.
221. Melrose Mun. Schools, 106 N.M. at 130, 740 P.2d at 124. The teacher coach, Wilkinson,
was discharged for "immorality and other good and just cause." Id. The Local Board "found that
Wilkinson had engaged in immoral conduct with one of the students at Melrose High School and
attempted to engage in similar conduct with others." Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. This issue is discussed infra at notes 256-62 and accompanying text.
225. 106 N.M. at 132, 740 P.2d at 126.
226. Id. The court did not decide the case on this issue because the court had earlier found that
the record did support the Local Board's decision to fire Wilkinson. Id. Thus, the court reversed
the State Board's decision on the latter ground. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
[Vol. 19
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
3. Standard of Proof
In Foster v. Board of Dentistry of New Mexico,221 the New Mexico
Supreme Court reiterated that the standard of proof to be applied in
administrative proceedings, with few exceptions, is preponderance of the
evidence. 23" A higher burden of proof (clear and convincing) is allowed
in civil cases only where allegations such as fraud are involved or where
the clear and convincing burden has been established by statute. 23' Foster
argued that the charges against him should have been proven at the hearing
by clear and convincing evidence.232 The court was unwilling to take any
judicial action to enlarge the area of exceptions requiring a higher standard
of proof.
233
It is unclear whether the appellant-dentist in this case argued that the
due process clauses of the New Mexico and United States constitutions
require a higher burden of proof. This is the context in which arguments
for a higher burden of proof have been made. 234 The court did not make
the context of the argument clear, perhaps because it disposed of the case
in Foster's favor on jurisdictional grounds 235 and only offered its discus-
sion of burden of proof in this case as dicta to guide future cases.236
4. Discovery
Certain statutes specifically authorize the use of discovery during ad-
229. 103 N.M. 776, 714 P.2d 580 (1986). Foster's dentistry license was suspended by the Board
of Dentistry, as discussed supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
230. 103 N.M. at 777, 714 P.2d at 581.
231. Id. at 778, 714 P.2d at 582. The court supplied three instances where the legislature has
provided for a clear and convincing standard. This standard must be met by the Board of Dentistry
and the Board of Medical Examiners to temporarily suspend the license of a dentist or physician,
respectively, without a hearing, for unfitness to practice. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-5-31 (D) and 61-
7-8(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1986). It must also be met in any proceeding to terminate parental rights. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 32-1-55(H) (Repl. Pamp. 1986). The requirement that a petitioner seeking to terminate
parental rights prove its case by clear and convincing evidence is mandated by the decision in
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In Santosky, the Court struck down a New York statute
which required the State to prove its allegations only by a "fair preponderance of the evidence."
Id. at 748, 758; N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §622 (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1981-1982). The majority
held that due process requires at least a "clear and convincing" burden of proof. 455 U.S. at 747-
48. The four dissenters argued that whether a "clear and convincing" standard be applied should
be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 773. See Brief Note, Santosky v. Kramer: Clear and
Convincing Evidence in Actions to Terminate Parental Rights, 36 U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 369 (1982).
232. Foster, 103 N.M. at 777, 714 P.2d at 581.
233. Id. at 778, 714 P.2d at 582.
234. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); supra note 231; and Hicks ex rel.
Feiock v. Feiock, 108 S.Ct. 1423 (1988) (holding that a statutory presumption that an obligated
parent remains able to make required child support payments-which reduces the state's burden of
proof in a contempt proceeding against the non-paying parent-comports with due process if the
contempt proceeding is civil, not criminal, in nature.)
235. See discussion supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
236. Foster, 103 N.M. at 778, 714 P.2d at 582.
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judicatory hearings.237 Others do not. In Redman v. Board of Regents of
New Mexico School for Visually Handicapped,238 the court of appeals
held that the State Board of Education had the authority to adopt regu-
lations permitting discovery proceedings during adjudicatory hearings,
even though the enabling act did not specifically grant this power to the
State Board.239 Courts traditionally view the implied powers of agencies
broadly.2 In Redman, however, the court had to deal with the additional
argument that the statute prohibited discovery because the law specifically
said that the Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence would not apply to
de novo hearings.24" ' The court, though, reasonably interpreted this lan-
guage to mean the legislature intended to facilitate discovery and pre-
sentation of evidence by not limiting the agency to these Rules.242 The
court, appropriately, did not reach the constitutional issue whether pro-
cedural due process would require the right to conduct discovery prior
to an informal adjudicatory hearing.243
On the other hand, courts are likely to be unimpressed by parties who
fail to take advantage of discovery procedures and later claim that they
were denied the right to discovery. In New Mexico Industrial Energy
Consumers v. New Mexico Public Service Commission,2" NMIEC, an
intervenor in a PSC task force, claimed that formal discovery procedures
were unavailable during the inquiry and that the group was thus denied
237. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §61-1-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1986) (Uniform Licensing Act); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 72-2-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1985) (in matters pertaining to public waters pending before
the state engineer).
238. 102 N.M. 234, 693 P.2d 1266 (Ct. App. 1984). See supra notes 195-202 and accompanying
text.
239. 102 N.M. at 237, 693 P.2d at 1269. Redman denied the Board's authority to issue the
regulation authorizing discovery (SBE Reg. 78-3(III)(B)) on the theory that the regulation was
inconsistent with statutory language in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-20(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1984) that
"[the Rules of Civil Procedure shall not apply to the de novo hearing." Id. The court held that the
Agency's powers included implied authority to issue regulations appropriate to its stated statutory
functions, including that of reviewing local board actions. Id.
240. Id. (citing Wimberly v. New Mexico State Police Board, 83 N.M. 757, 497 P.2d 968
(1972)).
241. See supra note 239.
242. Redman, 102 N.M. at 238, 693 P.2d at 1270.
243. Id. at 240, 693 P.2d at 1272. See, e.g., New Mexico Indus. Energy Consumers v. New
Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 104 N.M. 565, 568, 725 P.2d 244, 247 (1986) where the court says,
in dicta, that procedural due process mandates the right to conduct discovery, citing In re Miller,
88 N.M. 492, 542 P.2d 1182 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 5, 546 P.2d 70(1975). In Industrial
Energy Consumers, the court does not characterize the agency action at issue as either adjudication
or rulemaking. Thus it is unclear whether the court was talking about the right to discovery in both
an adjudicatory and rulemaking context. It is unlikely that the court would have meant to include
the latter. The Miller case involved a hearing before a county valuation protest board which denied
the protesting taxpayer the right to discovery by deposition of the County Assessor and of the State
Property Appraisal Department. Miller, 88 N.M. at 495, 542 P.2d at 1185.
244. 104 N.M. 565, 725 P.2d 244 (1986).
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procedural due process.245 The court held that NMIEC had a continuous
opportunity to demand discovery and failed to do so.246 Furthermore,
NMIEC failed to show how formal discovery procedures would have
gained the group any more information than was available through the
Task Force.247
5. Statement of Reasons
Agencies conducting adjudicatory hearings are required to enter find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law:248
The practical reasons for requiring administrative findings .... have
to do with facilitating judicial review, avoiding judicial usurpation
of administrative functions, assuring more careful administrative con-
sideration, helping parties plan their cases for rehearings and judicial
review, and keeping agencies within their jurisdictions.249
A case decided during the survey period that illustrates these principles
is Padilla v. Real Estate Commission of New Mexico.25 The Real Estate
Commission (Commission) revoked Padilla's license to sell real estate
due to representations Padilla made on Commission forms filed prior to
taking the real estate licensing exam.25' The Commission concluded that
245. Id. at 568, 725 P.2d at 247. PNM proposed an "inventoried capacity methodology" to deal
with the issue of rate treatment of excess capacity of electricity generating stations. Id. at 566, 725
P.2d at 245. NMIEC intervened and became a member of the Task Force created by the PSC to
study the question and propose an appropriate ratemaking methodology. Id. The Task Force arrived
at a Stipulation which NMIEC did not sign. Id. The Commission approved the Stipulation, and
NMIEC filed an application for rehearing, which was not granted. Id. NMIEC then appealed. Id.
246. Id. at 568, 725 P.2d at 247.
247. Id.
248. This principle was reaffirmed during the survey period in Cibola Energy Corp. v. Roselli,
105 N.M. 774, 778, 737 P.2d 555, 559 (Ct. App. 1987). See infra notes 249-50. Cibola involved
a protest of valuation made by the Valencia County Assessor. 105 N.M. at 775, 737 P.2d at 556.
The court set aside the valuation, finding it unsupported by substantial evidence and arbitrary. Id.
at 778, 737 P.2d at 559. Cibola had also complained that the Board's refusal to enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law was contrary to law. Id. The court did not need to reach this issue to
decide the case, but it nevertheless addressed it "as an aside." Id. Although the court found in this
case that it was able to make a determination regarding the Board's findings, it went out of its way
to emphasize the necessity for an agency to "indicate [its] reasoning ... and the basis on which it
acted." Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bernalillo County Valuation Protest Board, 90 N.M. 110,
115, 560 P.2d 174, 179 (Ct. App. 1977)).
249. 2 K. DAVtS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.05 at 444 (1958), quoted in Cibola, 105
N.M. at 778, 737 P.2d at 559.
250. 106 N.M. 96, 739 P.2d 965 (1987); see also Cibola, 105 N.M. 774, 778, 737 P.2d 555,
559 (expense to parties and Board incurred in entering findings of fact and conclusions of law not
valid reason for failure to enter same).
251. Padilla, 106 N.M. at 97, 739 P.2d at 966. The following question appeared on the registration
forms: "Do you have any unpaid liens or judgments filed against you?" Padilla answered "No" on
the forms. Id. At the time, there were outstanding judgments against Padilla to recover payment of
student loans. Id.
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the representations were false or fraudulent in violation of the Uniform
Licensing Act.252 The Commission failed to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law as to each element of fraud, however, and the court
was unable to resolve whether Padilla actually committed fraud.253 In
addition, the Commission findings failed to show the court that the mis-
representations were "substantial," which was an essential element of
false representation and which would allow the Board to revoke Padilla's
license.254 Therefore, the court remanded the case to the Commission
with directions to enter proper findings of fact and conclusions of law. 55
6. Rejection of Decision of Hearing Officer
In a significant case overruling earlier precedent, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals, in Board of Education of Melrose Municipal Schools
v. New Mexico State Board of Education,256 considered the process by
which a state board may adopt a decision contrary to a hearing officer's
recommendations.257 In Melrose Municipal Schools, the State Board of
Education rejected the findings of its hearing officer without reviewing
the transcript of either the Local Board hearing or the hearing conducted
by its hearing officer.2 58 In an earlier case with similar facts, Board of
Education of Alamogordo Public Schools District No. I v. Jennings,259
the court had held that the State Board did not have to hear new evidence,
review the transcript of the hearing before the hearing officer or defer to
the hearing officer's decision."6 Citing Judge Donnelly's dissent in Jen-
nings, the Melrose court overturned the Jennings decision to the extent
that the court now requires that before the State Board rejects the decision
of its hearing officer, at the very least, the Board must review enough of
the transcript of the proceedings before the hearing officer to support its
decision.26" ' The court pointed out that this requirement rises to the level
252. Id. The Uniform Licensing Act provision is N.M. STAT. ANN. §61-29-12 (Repl. Pamp.
1983 & Cum. Supp. 1986).
253. The Commission's findings did not resolve whether Padilla intended to deceive and to induce
the Commission to act in reliance upon a misrepresentation of a fact known by Padilla to be untrue,
which are the elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation. Padilla, 106 N.M. at 97-98, 739 P.2d at
966-67.
254. Id. at 98, 739 P.2d at 967.
255. Id.
256. 106 N.M. 129, 740 P.2d 123 (Ct. App. 1987). See supra notes 219-28 and accompanying
text.
257. 106 N.M. at 131-32, 740 P.2d at 125-26.
258. Id. at 130, 740 P.2d at 124.
259. 98 N.M. 602, 651 P.2d 1037 (Ct. App. 1982).
260. Melrose Mun. Schools, 106 N.M. at 130-31, 740 P.2d at 124-25 (citing Jennings, 98 N.M.
602, 651 P.2d 1037).
261. Id. at 131, 740 P.2d at 125. This may require review of the entire record, but does not mean
"that each Board member individually inspect every line of the record as compiled by the Board
and the hearing examiner." Id. (quoting from Megill v. Board of Regents of Fla., 541 F.2d 1073,
1080 (5th Cir. 1976)).
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of constitutional due process whenever the credibility of a witness is at
issue.262 The Jennings decision was left intact insofar as it holds the State
Board need not take new evidence to reverse the decision of its hearing
officer, even on points turning on the credibility of witnesses.
7. Subsequent Proceedings
In Board of Education of Santa Fe Public Schools v. Sullivan,263 the
issue was whether termination proceedings against a teacher could be
reinstated after the original termination proceedings were reversed on
procedural grounds. 2" The New Mexico Supreme Court held that where
the original termination proceedings were reversed due to a procedural
defect, the Local Board of Education could reinstate termination pro-
ceedings, correct the procedural defect, and rely upon the same alleged
acts of misconduct that had been relied upon in the original proceedings.265
F. Enforcement of Rules
There were two cases decided during the survey period relating to
whether agencies can enforce the rules they promulgate. One involved
the question whether disciplinary prison rules need be filed with the State
Records Administrator to be enforceable. The other was a case of first
impression regarding when an agency rule may be stayed pending appeal.
Under the State Rules Act,2" certain rules and regulations must be filed
with the State Records Administrator to be effective.267 In Johnson v.
Francke, 68 inmates at the New Mexico State Penitentiary in Santa Fe
brought an action against the Secretary of Corrections seeking a decla-
ratory judgment that 'rules and regulations governing conduct and disci-
pline of prisoners were unenforceable because they had not been filed in
262. "Where, as in this case, the ultimate decision rests upon the credibility of ... major
witnesses, a review of the hearing officer's report, without review of the entire record in the case,
does not accord the fundamental due process." Id. (quoting from Jennings, 98 N.M. at 614, 651
P.2d at 1049 (Donnelly, J., dissenting)).
263. 106 N.M. 125, 740 P.2d 119 (1987).
264. During the first termination proceeding, the Santa Fe Board of Education terminated Sul-
livan's teaching contract on the grounds of incompetence and insubordination. Id. The State Board
reversed the termination based upon the Local Board's failure to comply with the Open Meetings
Act. Id. The Local Board then recommenced termination proceedings against Sullivan. Id. The
Board relied on the same alleged misconduct that was relied upon in the previous proceeding and
again terminated Sullivan. Id. The State Board reversed this termination on the ground that the Local
Board's reliance upon the same misconduct in subsequent proceedings was a prejudicial departure
from required procedures. Id.
265. Id. at 126, 740 P.2d at 120.
266. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-3-24, 14-3-25, 14-4-1 to -9 (1978 and Cum. Supp. 1987).
267. Id. See also Rivas v. Board of Cosmetologists, 101 N.M. 592, 686 P.2d 934 (1984), supra
notes 152-62 and accompanying text (repeal of regulation invalid for failure to file with State Records
Administrator).
268. 105 N.M. 564, 734 P.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1987).
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accordance with the State Rules Act.269 The Corrections Department Act
provides that "[aill rules and regulations shall be filed in accordance with
the State Rules Act. 2 70 The State Rules Act provides that no rule will
be enforceable until it is filed in the state's record center.27' The Act,
however, defines "rule" to exclude "rules relating to the management,
confinement, discipline or release of inmates of any penal or charitable
institution. 272
The New Mexico Court of Appeals interpreted both Acts and held that
the Corrections Act means that filing of rules must be conducted consistent
with the entirety of the State Rules Act and in a manner not repugnant
to any of the latter Act's provisions. 273 Because the State Rules Act
specifically exempts disciplinary prison rules, the Correction Secretary
can enforce those rules without filing them with the State Records Ad-
ministrator.274
In Tenneco Oil Co. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Commis-
sion,275 the court of appeals announced a standard for courts to follow,
in the absence of any statutory provision, in deciding whether to grant a
stay of an agency regulation during its appeal. In Tenneco, the plaintiffs
appealed from a Commission order adopting amendments to certain
regulations 276 and applied to stay enforcement of the regulatory amend-
ments during the pendency of their appeal.277 While there was no specific
statute governing the granting of such a stay, the court held that it had
implied power to grant the stay incident to its power to review final
administrative orders.278
The court announced a preliminary-injunction-like test to determine
whether a stay in such a case should be granted: 1) is it likely that the
applicant will prevail on the merits of the appeal, 2) will the applicant
suffer irreparable harm unless the stay is granted, 3) will no substantial
harm result to other interested persons, and 4) will no harm ensue to the
public interest.279 In Tenneco, the plaintiffs had not alleged specifically
269. Id. at 564-65, 734 P.2d at 804-05.
270. Id. at 566, 734 P.2d at 806 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 9-3-5(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1983)).
271. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-5 (1978).
272. Johnson, 105 N.M. at 566, 734 P.2d at 806 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-2(C) (1978)).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 567, 734 P.2d at 807.
275. 105 N.M. 708, 736 P.2d 986 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 714, 749 P.2d 99
(1988).
276. The amendments set more stringent numerical standards for discharge of substances which
are controlled by the Commission. Id. at 709, 736 P.2d at 987.
277. Id. The case was joined with another case, Navajo Refining Co. v. New Mexico Water
Quality Control Comm'n, 105 N.M. 708, 736 P.2d 986 (1986). Both Navajo and Tenneco applied
for the stay. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 710, 736 P.2d at 988. The court adopted the test articulated in Associated Sec. Corp.
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in what manner irreparable harm would result unless a stay was granted.
The court found insufficient cause to grant the stay under the above
standard.280
IV. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Judicial review is an independent guarantee of the legality of admin-
istrative action. As one commentator has put it,
From the point of view of an agency, the question of the legitimacy
of its action is secondary to that of the positive solution of a problem.
It is for this reason that we, in common with nearly all of the Western
countries, have concluded that the maintenance of legitimacy requires
a judicial body independent of the active administration. 28'
During this survey period, there were many cases elucidating the follow-
ing precepts of judicial review: the appropriate timing of review, the
appropriate standard of review, the limitations on review imposed by both
the legislature and the judiciary, and the cost of appeal.
A. Timing of Judicial Review
There were three cases during the survey period which dealt with the
timing of judicial review. One case involved the issue of whether an order
was final and thus appealable; two cases concerned the timeliness of an
appeal; and one of the latter cases also dealt with notification of the appeal
procedure.
1. Judicial Review of Final Action
Harris v. Revenue Division of Taxation & Revenue Department2 2 pre-
sented a conflict between an agency order that purported to be appealable
and a statute that provided clearly that the order was not appealable. In
Harris, an administrative hearing officer dismissed the Harris' adminis-
trative appeal of the denial of a solar rebate on their state tax return. 283
Mr. and Mrs. Harris appealed the dismissal of their case. 284 The statute
governing the taxpayers' appeal contemplated that a final and appealable
v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 283 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1960), and Teleconnect Co. v. Iowa
State Commerce Comm'n, 366 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1985). Id.
280. Tenneco, 105 N.M. at 710, 736 P.2d at 988.
281. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 323 (1965).
282. 105 N.M. 721, 737 P.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1987).
283. The Harrises filed a protest about the denial, but failed to comply with the deadline for
filing their brief. Id. at 722, 737 P.2d at 81. The Taxation & Revenue Department filed a motion
to dismiss, which the hearing officer granted. Id. The Harrises filed a motion to reconsider the order
of dismissal. It was denied. Id.
284. The Harrises filed an appeal from the hearing officer's order of dismissal and denial of their
motion to reconsider. Id.
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order would be one signed by the Department director.25 The order that
was the subject of the appeal was not approved or signed by the director,
and therefore was not an appealable order under the statute. 286 However,
the order itself did instruct the Harrises that they could appeal it. 287 The
court, nevertheless, easily held the order not to be final or appealable
because it had not been submitted to a superior for approval. 288 The court
remanded the case to the Department to have the director take some action
on the order.289
2. Timeliness of Appeal
The court in James v. New Mexico Human Services Department, Income
Support Division2' has painted a bright line for deciding whether the
court rule or the statute governs when they both purport to rule an aspect
of the appeal of an agency decision but they are inconsistent. In James,
a supreme court rule provided that notwithstanding any other provision
of law, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days from the date
of an order. 29 ' The statute, however, provided that a party could take an
appeal within thirty days of "receiving written notice of the decision. '292
The court found that because the provisions at issue dealt with a time
limitation on the right to appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court rule
governed over the inconsistent statute. 2 1 In so finding, the court pointed
out that the holding would be otherwise if the provisions at issue dealt
with the right to appeal or the appropriate court to hear the appeal.294
285. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-1-25 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) reads as follows:
If the . . . claimant is dissatisfied with the action and order of the director
after a hearing, he may appeal to the court of appeals for further relief[.] . . .
All such appeals . . . shall be taken within thirty days of the date of mailing
or delivery of the written decision and order of the director to the protestant
or claimant ....
105 N.M. at 722, 737 P.2d at 81 (emphasis added). During the appeal, this section was amended
and the word "director" was changed to "secretary." Id. at 722 n. 1, 737 P.2d at 81 n. 1.
286. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-1-24(H) (Repl. Pamp. 1983)).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 722-23, 737 P.2d at 81-82.
290. 106 N.M. 318, 742 P.2d 530 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 353, 742 P.2d 1058
(1987).
291. Id. at 319, 742 P.2d at 531. SCRA 1986, 12-601(A) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law, direct appeals from orders, decisions or actions of boards, commissions,
administrative agencies or officials shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal . . . within thirty (30)
days from the date of the order, decision or action appealed from."
292. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
293. James, 106 N.M. at 319, 742 P.2d at 531.
294. The plaintiffs had relied on the case of In Re Application of Angel Fire Corp., 96 N.M.
651, 634 P.2d 202 (1981), to argue that the statute should govern. 106 N.M. at 319, 742 P.2d at
531. In that case the court held that where a statute establishes which orders may be appealed and
the procedure for taking a case out of the administrative framework and into court, the statutory
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These provisions, it said, are jurisdictional, while time limits have long
been held to be peculiarly within the power of the judiciary to set.295
3. Notification of Appeal Procedure
The plaintiff in James296 also contended that the Human Services De-
partment (HSD) was required to notify her directly of her right to appeal
and that the notification must include accurate advice about the time for
taking an appeal. 297 The administrative decision told James that she could
appeal within thirty days of receipt of the notice.29 ' However, this infor-
mation was based on the agency's belief that the statutory time for appeal
applied, rather than the supreme court rule's time for appeal. As a result
of the court's decision that the supreme court rule applied, - 9 the infor-
mation the agency gave James was incorrect, and James' appeal was filed
too late to comply with the supreme court rule. 3' The court rejected
James' argument, finding the statute only required notification of the right
to review.3° ' The court would not imply an additional requirement that
the agency provide complete advice concerning the right to judicial re-
view. 3 2 Furthermore, the court held that it had no discretion to suspend
the application of the offending rule.3 °3
B. Scope of Review
The scope of review available to courts is traditionally broad. A court
may review and uphold, or set aside, agency findings of fact, agency
conclusions of law, and agency actions. There are, however, different
standards which the courts must follow depending on what aspect of the
agency decision is being appealed. Cases decided during this survey
process must be complied with, even though the statute conflicts with a court rule. Angel Fire, 96
N.M. at 652, 634 P.2d at 203. The James court distinguished its case from Angel Fire by stating
that James dealt with a time limitation on the right to appeal rather than a method of appealing,
which is jurisdictional. James, 106 N.M. at 319, 742 P.2d at 531. The James court also cited
American Auto. Ass'n v. State Corp. Comm'n, 102 N.M. 527, 697 P.2d 946 (1985), in support of
its holding. 106 N.M. at 319, 742 P.2d at 531. In American Auto. Ass'n, there was a conflict between
N.M. STAT. ANN. §65-2-120(G) (Repl. Pamp. 1981), which gave parties in motor carrier cases 60
days to appeal, and N.M.R. Ctv. App. 3(a) (Repl. Pamp. 1984), which allowed the parties only 30
days to appeal. American Auto. Ass'n, 102 N.M. at 528, 697 P.2d at 947. The court held that the
applicable rule was the court rule. Id. at 528, 697 P.2d at 947.
295. James, 106 N.M. at 319, 742 P.2d at 531.
296. Id. at 318, 742 P.2d at 530.
297. Id. at 320, 742 P.2d at 532.
298. Id.
299. Discussed supra notes 290-95 and accompanying text.
300. James, 106 N.M. at 320, 742 P.2d at 532.
301. Id. at 320, 742 P.2d at 532.
302. Id. The court noted that other details of obtaining review were also not included in the
notice, such as filing a notice of appeal. Id.
303. Id.
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period show how courts decide which standard to apply during their
review, and show how the courts apply the contrary to law and substantial
evidence standards.
1. Appropriate Standard of Review
There are generally three accepted standards for review of administra-
tive decisions: substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, and "other-
wise not in accordance with law." 3" The determination of which standard
to apply in a given case can be unclear.3"5 The following case reads like
a textbook example of how courts properly choose and apply the appro-
priate standard of review."
In Perkins v. Department of Human Services,3"7 the court of appeals
used all three standards of review in analyzing the case. Plaintiff Thomp-
son was employed as county office manager and plaintiff Perkins was
employed as a supervisor for the Human Services Department's (HSD)
Dona Ana County office.30 8 HSD terminated Perkins and Thompson for
various charges arising out of the sexual and physical abuse of a teenage
girl whom HSD had placed in a foster home.3 °" The State Personnel Board
affirmed the decision of HSD and the district court upheld the decision
of the Board.3"' On appeal, the court of appeals first applied the substantial
evidence rule3 ' and determined that substantial evidence supported the
findings of fact by the Personnel Board and the district court.31 2 The court
then reviewed the Board decision and applied the arbitrary and capricious
standard.3"3 The court's role on appeal under this standard is to review
304. 1983-84 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 1, at 145.
305. See id. at 145 n.164.
306. But cf. Elliott v. New Mexico Real Estate Comm'n, 103 N.M. 273, 275, 705 P.2d 679,
681 (1985), also discussed supra text accompanying notes 100-09, where the court affirmed the
lower court's statutory interpretation, citing to the substantial evidence test:
Elliott argues that the Commission had no jurisdiction over the parties or the
subject matter of the proceeding because the legislative grant of authority...
does not include the sale of a real estate contract. We disagree. The district
court found that Elliott is a real estate broker as defined in Section 61-29-2(A)
and that he represented himself as such and acted in that capacity. Furthermore,
the contract itself indicated that Elliott was being employed in a broker's
capacity. He also received a commission for the transaction. Under these facts,
there was substantial evidence to support the district court's judgment.
307. 106 N.M. 651, 748 P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1987).
308. Id. at 652, 748 P.2d at 25.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 653, 748 P.2d at 26.
311. The court used the whole record substantial evidence standard as outlined in Trujillo v.
Employment Sec. Dep't, 105 N.M. 467, 734 P.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1987), discussed infra notes 336-
52 and accompanying text. Perkins, 106 N.M. at 654, 748 P.2d at 27.
312. Perkins, 106 N.M. at 655, 748 P.2d at 28.
313. Id.
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the record to determine whether there has been unreasoned action without
proper consideration for the facts and circumstances." 4 Where the court
could form two opinions, the action is not arbitrary or capricious if
exercised honestly and upon due consideration." 5 Because the findings
in Perkins were supported by substantial evidence, those findings, in turn,
supported the conclusions of the Board and the district court.316
The court then applied the "not in accordance with law" standard.3"7
Plaintiffs claimed that they did not know of the alleged abuse of the HSD
ward and that they were not the proper officials to report the abuse.3"'
Therefore, plaintiffs argued, they could not be held responsible for the
abuse and their dismissal was not in accordance with law.3"9 The court
found, however, that both employees had a duty to oversee and supervise,
in a reasonably diligent manner, the safety of children entrusted to HSD
in their county.32° The court found they had breached this duty.32' There-
fore, the decision of the agency was in accordance with law and the
appeals court affirmed the decisions of the district court and the Personnel
Board."'
2. Question of Law; Statutory Interpretation
Most of the statutory interpretation cases the courts decided during the
survey period add little to an administrative law survey because they dealt
only with the substantive law.3 23 The substantive law interpreted in Varoz
v. New Mexico Board of Podiatry,3 24 however, is the statute of limitations
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 656, 748 P.2d at 29.
317. Id. The term "not in accordance with the law" involves agency action which is based on
an error of law, is arbitrary and unreasonable, or is based on conjecture and is inconsistent with
established facts. Id.
318. Id. At this point, the court did review evidence which was contrary to the decision of the
hearing officer appointed by the State Personnel Board.
319. Id. at 656, 748 P.2d at 29.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 657, 748 P.2d at 30.
323. See, e.g., Perkins, 106 N.M. at 651, 748 P.2d at 24 (duty of HSD employees); Public Serv.
Co. of New Mexico v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 106 N.M. 622, 747 P.2d 917 (public
utility law); New Mexico Indus. Energy Consumers v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 104 N.M.
565, 725 P.2d 244 (1986) (public utility law); In re Electrical Serv. in San Miguel County, 102
N.M. 529, 697 P.2d 948 (public utility law); Climax Chemical Co. v. New Mexico Envt'l Improve-
ment Bd., 106 N.M. 14, 738 P.2d 132 (environmental law); Patterson v. Envt'l Improvement Div.,
105 N.M. 320, 731 P.2d 1364 (Ct. App. 1986) (environmental law); In re Proposed Revocation of
Food & Drink Purveyor's Permit for House of Pancakes, 102 N.M. 63, 691 P.2d 64 (Ct. App.
1984) (environmental law); and Grauerholtz v. New Mexico Labor and Indus. Comm'n, 104 N.M.
674, 726 P.2d 351 (1986) (labor law). For a discussion of how courts use agency interpretations of
the laws they administer, see supra notes 58-120 and accompanying text.
324. 104 N.M. 454, 722 P.2d 1176 (1986).
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provision of the Uniform Licensing Act, which does have implications
for administrative law. In this case, the Board revoked Dr. Varoz's license
to practice podiatry based on Varoz's criminal conviction on fraud charges.3"
Dr. Varoz argued that the statute of limitations for an action to revoke a
professional license had run with respect to all of his convictions except
one.326 The court interpreted the statute of limitations provision of the
Uniform Licensing Act327 which limits the time within which an agency
can revoke, suspend or withhold renewal of a license. Under this pro-
vision, the limitation period begins to run from the date of the licensee's
culpable conduct.328 The court held that such "conduct" does not include
a criminal conviction.329 Thus, the board can pursue license revocation
for criminal conduct if it does so within two years of the conduct, but it
cannot rely on the licensee's criminal conviction for such conduct as a
basis for otherwise extending the two year statute of limitations.33 ° With
respect to the three convictions which the Tenth Circuit upheld in Varoz's
case, the limitation period had completely expired on one of Varoz's
convictions. The Board should not have considered that conviction and
the underlying conduct. " The Board's action on the convictions under
the other two counts, however, occurred well within the statute of lim-
itation time period.332
3. Question of Fact; Substantial Evidence
The substantial evidence standard is the most frequently used in judicial
325. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
326. Varoz, 104 N.M. at 455, 722 P.2d at 1177. §61-8-11(B) of the Podiatry Act, N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§61-8-1 to -17 (Repl. Pamp. 1981), listed ten "reasons" for which a license could be
suspended or revoked, including "conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." Varoz, 104
N.M. at 455, 722 P.2d at 1177.
327. N.M. STAT. ANN. §61-1-3.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1986). It provides:
A. No action which would have any of the effects specified in Subsections D,
E or F of Section 61-1-3 NMSA 1978 may be initiated by a board later than
two years after the conduct which would be the basis for the action.
B. The time limitation contained in Subsection A of this section shall be tolled
by any civil or criminal litigation in which the licensee or applicant is a party
arising from substantially the same facts, conduct, transaction or transactions
which would be the basis for the board's action.
Subsections D, E and F of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61- I-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1986), referred to in subsection
A, above, deal with board hearings (1) to withhold the renewal of a license for any cause other than
failure to pay the required renewal fee; (2) to suspend a license; and (3) to revoke a license,
respectively.
328. Varoz, 104 N.M. at 455, 722 P.2d at 1177.
329. Id.
330. The court also pointed out that N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-1-3.1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1986) provides
that the two year period is tolled by any criminal litigation arising from the same conduct. Id. at
456-57, 722 P.2d at 1178-79. Assuming there is a conviction, this criminal litigation is final pending
appeal. Id. at 457, 722 P.2d at 1179.
331. Id. at 458, 722 P.2d at 1180.
332. Id.
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review of administrative findings of fact.333 During the last survey period,
in Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Environmental Improvement
Board (Duke City I),"' the supreme court adopted the "whole record"
scope of review for review of agency findings of fact under the substantial
evidence test. Previously, New Mexico's scope of review under this test
required the court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
agency, ignoring any contrary evidence.335 During this survey period, the
court of appeals in Trujillo v. Employment Security Department336 sought-
a bit unsuccessfully-to clarify the new "whole record review" test.337
The Trujillo court was concerned with two aspects of the substantial
evidence test enunciated in Duke City 11 and subsequently applied by the
supreme court. First, it was confused whether some language in Duke
City 11, taken from an earlier case, authorized New Mexico courts to
make independent findings in agency review cases where the court never-
theless found the agency decision supported by substantial evidence.338
The court noted that the holding in that earlier case was to the contrary.339
Therefore, the Trujillo court concluded, the "true meaning" of this dicta
was that a court could not make an independent finding if the agency's
finding was supported by substantial evidence (using the new scope of
review) but that a court could make an independent finding if the agency
finding was unsupported by substantial evidence.34
333. For cases decided during the survey period using the substantial evidence standard, see State
Dep't of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div. v. Romero, 106 N.M. 657, 748 P.2d 30 (Ct. App. 1987);
Cibola Energy Corp. v. Roselli, 105 N.M. 774, 737 P.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1987); Board of Educ. of
Melrose Municipal Schools v. New Mexico Bd. of Educ., 106 N.M. 129, 740 P.2d 123 (Ct. App.
1987); New Mexico Indus. Energy Consumers v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 104 N.M. 565,
725 P.2d 244 (1986); Board of Educ. of Taos Municipal Schools v. Singleton, 103 N.M. 722, 712
P.2d 1384 (Ct. App. 1985); Attorney Gen'l of State of New Mexico v. New Mexico Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 101 N.M. 549, 685 P.2d 957 (1984).
334. 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984). For a discussion of this case and its significance, see
1983-84 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 1, at 148-50 and Browde, Substantial Evidence
Reconsidered: The Post-Duke City Difficulties and Some Suggestions for Their Resolution, 18 N.M.
L. REV. 525 (1988) [hereinafter cited as Substantial Evidence Reconsidered].
335. Trujillo v. Employment Sec. Dept., 105 N.M. 467, 469, 734 P.2d 245, 247 (Ct. App. 1987);
1983-84 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 1, at 149 n. 179.
336. 105 N.M. 467, 734 P.2d 245.
337. The discussion of the new substantial evidence standard in Duke City I was quite confusing.
See infra notes 338-46 and accompanying text and Substantial Evidence Reconsidered, supra note
334, at 530-35. The post Duke City I1 supreme court decisions have also "fail[ed] to resolve what
the whole record standard is supposed to mean." Substantial Evidence Reconsidered, supra note
334, at 539.
338. 105 N.M. at 469, 734 P.2d at 247. In Duke City I1, the court had said, "Because of the
minor departure from the customary substantial evidence rule in reviewing administrative decisions
where the record as a whole must be considered, the reviewing court may act on other convincing
evidence in the record and may make its own findings based thereon." 101 N.M. at 294, 681 P.2d
at 720 (quoting New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't v. Garcia, 94 N.M. 175, 177, 608 P.2d 151, 153
(1980)).
339. Trujillo. 105 N.M. at 469, 734 P.2d at 247. The Garcia court's holding permitted independent
findings only if the Board's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Id.
340. Id. at 469-70, 734 P.2d at 247-48.
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Although the court is undoubtedly correct in its former interpretation,
its latter pronouncement is of concern. 34 ' This pronouncement calls into
question the relative roles of the judiciary and the administrative agency.
The court of appeals seems to imply that if a variety of conclusions can
be drawn from a given record, a court can properly draw the one it wishes
(if the agency has already drawn one incorrectly). It seems inappropriate
for the court to assume the fact-finding power that the legislature has
delegated to the agency.342 The better course would be for the court to
remand the case to the agency to make a new finding of fact supported
by substantial evidence. The appellate court would still be able to void
any arbitrary finding of the agency on appeal.
The second concern of the Trujillo court was that the supreme court
in Duke City II, and in subsequent decisions, stated that in applying the
new whole record scope of review, it would "view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the decision" by the agency. 43 The Trujillo court
found this approach contrary to the supreme court's adoption of the whole
record scope of review.3" Apparently, the Trujillo court felt that in re-
jecting the old scope of review (which required the courts to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the agency, ignoring contrary
evidence34 5), the court could no longer look at any of the evidence in the
light most favorable to the agency. Therefore, the Trujillo court concluded
that what the supreme court really meant was that the court had to view
the evidence "in light of the entire record" rather than in the light most
favorable to the agency.346
In a recent case, however, the supreme court, without citing the Trujillo
case, rejected this interpretation of its adoption of whole record review. 347
Rather, the supreme court reaffirmed that it would "view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the agency decision," while emphasizing
that it would "not view favorable evidence with total disregard to con-
travening evidence. 3 48 Although these two positions may at first blush
seem contradictory, it is not too difficult to see how they may be rec-
341. For further discussion on this point, see Substantial Evidence Reconsidered, supra note 334,
at 544-49.
342. For a case decided during the survey period in support of this view see Tapia v. City of
Albuquerque, 104 N.M. 117, 717 P.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1986) (district court had the power to set aside
administrative order but exceeded its authority by modifying the order).
343. Trujillo, 105 N.M. at 470, 734 P.2d at 248.
344. Id. For further discussion on this point, see Substantial Evidence Reconsidered, supra note
334, at 540-44.
345. Trujillo, 105 N.M. at 470, 734 P.2d at 248.
346. Id.
347. Nat'l Council on Compensation Ins. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 107 N.M. 278,
756 P.2d 558 (1988).
348. Id. at 282, 756 P.2d at 562.
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onciled. First, the court may merely be stating that it is not going to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency if the agency's conclusion
is supported by substantial evidence. Second, the supreme court may be
saying that it is going to defer to the weight given to particular facts by
the agency and to inferences drawn by the agency from the facts pre-
sented.3 49 These are long-standing practices in federal courts operating
under the whole record scope of review.35 °
While it is laudable that the Trujillo court sought to clarify whole record
review, it may be that Professor Davis is correct in observing that "scope
of review may have infinite dimensions that can be sensed but not artic-
ulated." 35' Davis' message is that, "Everyone-legislators, judges, prac-
titioners, and critics-should learn from the experience of the past quarter
of a century that refining the verbalisms about scope of review is not
merely unprofitable but harmful." 352 In keeping with this admonition, we
move without adieu to our next section.
C. Limitations on Judicial Review
The legislature, or the court itself, may impose limitations on judicial
review. All the cases decided this survey period involve legislatively
imposed limitations, including restriction of the right to judicial review,
the requirement of exhaustion of administrative review prior to judicial
review, the requirement of district court review prior to appellate court
review, statutory criteria for standing and provisions limiting venue.
1. Lack of Jurisdiction
Before judicial review occurs, a court must have proper jurisdiction.
In several cases during the survey period, the appeal was dismissed by
the district court or a higher appellate court because there was no statutory
authority to bring an appeal.353 Illustrative of these cases is United Nuclear
Corp. v. Fort.354 The Environmental Improvement Division denied United
Nuclear Corp.'s (UNC) request for an exemption from certain radiation
349. See, e.g., Tapia, 104 N.M. at 120, 717 P.2d at 96 ("The trial court does not reweigh
evidence nor does it substitute its judgment for that of the administrative factfinder," citing Mutz
v. Municipal Boundary Comm'n, 101 N.M. 694, 688 P.2d 12 (1984)).
350. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 65, § 29:25 at 448-51; ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY, supra note 65, at 207 ("For most judges, the greater the apparent
importance of specialized agency experience in evaluating data, the greater the deference they will
accord to agency factual conclusions.").
351. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 65, § 29:27 at 460.
352. Id. § 29:27 at 457.
353. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pilot Dev. Northwest, Inc. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Bureau,
102 N.M. 791, 701 P.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1985) (nursing home had no right to appeal hearing officer's
denial of motion to reconsider denial of application).
354. 102 N.M. 756, 700 P.2d 1005 (Ct. App. 1985).
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regulations.35  UNC appealed and filed suit in district court. 356
The district court dismissed the action, concluding that it had no ju-
risdiction over the matter because the Division actions were not "licensing
actions." which would give the court jurisdiction.3 57 The New Mexico
Court of Appeals, however, reversed and held that the Agency's denial
of an exemption from Division regulations did constitute a licensing
action, and thus, the district court did have appellate jurisdiction to review
the Division's denial of UNC's exemption request.
3 51
2. Exhaustion
In order to obtain judicial review, appellants may be required to exhaust
potential administrative remedies. In Madrid v. Department of Insur-
ance,359 the supreme court interpreted the Bail Bondsmen Licensing Law"
and the Uniform Licensing Act36' and concluded that the correct avenue
of appeal from an order of the Superintendent of Insurance revoking a
bail bondsmen license is by petition to the State Corporation Commis-
sion. Only after a hearing by the Commission can the licensee appealto the district court. 3 6 3
3. Second-Tier Review
On occasion, statutes provide that appellants must first appeal to a
district court and then may appeal to higher courts (sometimes called
second-tier judicial review). 3' For example, in Eastern Indemnity Co. of
355. UNC applied to the Division for an exemption from radiation regulations that required UNC
to stabilize and provide liquid treatment for uranium tailings and tailings ponds. Id. at 758, 700
P.2d at 1007.
356. Id.
357. Id. The court determined the actions were not "licensing actions" within the meaning of
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-3-9(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1983). Id. Section 74-3-9(E) reads as follows:
Any person who is or may be affected by licensing action of the agency may
appeal for further relief to the district court in which the subject facilities or
activities are located. All such appeals shall be upon the agency's administrative
records ...
358. United Nuclear, 102 N.M. at 759, 700 P.2d at 1008.
359. 102 N.M. 442, 697 P.2d 125 (1985).
360. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§59-51-1 to -19 (1984).
361. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§61-1-1 to -31 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
362. Madrid, 102 N.M. at 443, 697 P.2d at 126. The Superintendent of Insurance suspended
Madrid's property bondsman and limited surety agency licenses. Id.
363. Id. In the revision of the Insurance Code effective January I, 1985, a licensee may appeal
to the district court after a hearing before either the Corporation Commission or the Insurance Board.
Id. at 444, 697 P.2d at 127. Even under the new statute, a direct appeal to the court from an order
of the superintendent is not authorized. Id. at 444-45, 697 P.2d at 127-28.
364. For a criticism of second-tier substantial evidence review see 1983-84 Administrative Law
Survey, supra note 1, at 150-52. Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, 104 N.M. 117, 717 P.2d 93 (Ct.
App. 1986), is a survey period case involving second-tier review.
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Maryland v. Heller,365 the court of appeals held that there was no provision
of law which allowed the court to directly review a wage claim deter-
mination of the Labor and Industrial Commission. 3" Rather, the aggrieved
party must first appeal to district court and then could appeal the district
court's decision to the court of appeals.367
4. Standing
Appellants must have standing to invoke the power of the court.3 6 8 The
question of standing relates to whether the litigant is entitled to have the
court decide the merits of the appeal.369 In two cases decided during the
survey period, the courts decided that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
appeal the agency decision in their case.
In Webb v. Fox,37 ° F&W Enterprises (F&W) applied to the Dona Ana
County Planning Commission for a special use permit for property which
was owned by C.L. Crowder Investment Co. and which F&W intended
to buy.37" ' The Commission denied the application.37 F&W then appealed
the denial to the County Board of Zoning Appeals.373 The Board reversed
the decision of the Commission and granted F&W a special use permit.374
F&W subsequently purchased the Crowder property.375
Plaintiffs, owners 6f residential property near the land in question,
appealed the decision of the Board.376 Plaintiffs contended that the Board
lacked jurisdiction to hear F&W's appeal from the Commission decision
because F&W was not an "aggrieved person" who had standing to appeal
under the statute.377 The court interpreted "aggrieved person" to mean a
365. 102 N.M. 144, 692 P.2d 530 (Ct. App. 1984).
366. Id. at 145, 692 P.2d at 531.
367. Id. at 146, 692 P.2d at 532. See also In re Twining Water & Sanitation Dist., 101 N.M.
738, 688 P.2d 775 (1984) (appeal from order of PSC approving rates set by a water district must
first be brought in district court).
368. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
369. Id. at 750-51.
370. 105 N.M. 723, 737 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1987).
371. Id. at 724, 737 P.2d at 83. F&W intended to purchase the land and develop it in three
phases. Id. The first phase involved construction of storage lockers and recreational vehicle parking
spaces. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. The special use permit was for phase one of the project but was for a different site than
previously requested.
375. Id.
376. The plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari to the district court. Id. The district court dismissed
the petition. Id. The plaintiffs then appealed the district court decision to the court of appeals. Id.
377. Id. at 724-25, 737 P.2d at 83-84. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-21-8(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1985) permitted
an appeal from the planning commission's decision' to the board of appeals "by any person aggrieved
. . . or affected" or "by the applicant or by any other interested party." Id. at 725, 737 P.2d at 84.
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zoning applicant who has a recognizable right or interest in the property
at issue.37 Because F&W did not have either a legal or equitable interest
in the property during the pendency of the zoning application,379 the court
properly found that F&W lacked "standing" to appeal the decision of the
Commission to the Board.38° The court of appeals ordered the trial court
to enter an order reversing the decision of the Board and affirming the
decision of the Commission.38" '
In State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Manfre,382 Manfre
appealed an order the Human Services Department (HSD) entered which
affirmed its earlier submission of Manfre's name to the Internal Revenue
Service to have his income tax refund intercepted so it could be applied
to unpaid child support arrearages.383 The New Mexico Court of Appeals
dismissed thecase on the grounds that Manfre did not have standing to
appeal the adverse decision of HSD.384 The statute limits appeals from
fair hearing decisions of HSD to applicants or recipients of services or
assistance from HSD.385 Because Manfre's hearing had nothing to do with
his applying for, or receiving, assistance or services, the court held that
it had no jurisdiction over Manfre's appeal. 386
5. Venue
Another consideration for a court is whether there is proper venue-
has the suit been brought in the proper place.387 In a matter of first
impression in New Mexico, the court of appeals, in United Nuclear Corp.
v. Fort,388 also decided the issue of venue when multiple claims are alleged
378. Id.
379. The court recognized that a prospective purchaser under an executed contract to purchase
would have standing as would a prospective purchaser whose contract is conditioned upon receiving
the zoning change. Id. Apparently F&W had neither. F&W argued that it had an equitable interest
in the property by virtue of its application and an unsigned and undated warranty deed granting the
property to F&W. Id. at 726, 737 P.2d at 85. The court did not view the record as supporting F&W's
claims. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. To hold to the contrary would arguably allow any stranger to a particular piece of land
to seek a zoning change to it and appeal a denial.
382. 102 N.M. 241, 693 P.2d 1273 (Ct. App. 1984).
383. Id. at 241-42, 693 P.2d at 1273-74. The Child Support Enforcement Bureau submitted
Manfre's name to the IRS for the interception of his federal income tax refund to partially reimburse
the Department for Aid to Families with Dependent 'Children (AFDC), which had granted aid to
Manfre's children. Id. Manfre appealed the agency's action but a fair hearing officer affirmed the
agency determination. Id.
384. Id. at 243, 693 P.2d at 1275.
385. Id. at 242, 693 P.2d at 1274 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §27-3-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1984)).
386. The court stated that its decision in Manfre did not leave Manfre without a remedy. 102
N.M. at 243 n.2, 693 P.2d at 1275 n.2. The court suggested Manfre could pursue a declaratory
judgment in district court or apply for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 244, 693 P.2d at 1276.
387. 1980-81 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 1, at 33.
388. 102 N.M. 756, 700 P.2d 1005 (1985). See supra text accompanying notes 354-58.
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and each claim is governed by a different venue statute. In this case,
United Nuclear Corp. (UNC), which held a license to operate a uranium
mill, filed suit after the Environmental Improvement Division denied
UNC's request for an exemption from Division radiation regulations.389
In its complaint, UNC brought a claim against the Division Director,
alleging she acted illegally, and also brought claims regarding the Di-
vision's licensing actions. Two venue statutes applied here. Section 38-
3-1 (G)39' required venue in Santa Fe County for claims against state
officials. The court held this applied to UNC's claims against the Division
Director.39" ' Section 74-3-9(E) 392 allowed claims by persons affected by
"licensing actions" to be brought in the county where the facilities or
activities are located (McKinley County in the present case).
The court announced that when, as in this case, separate causes of
action have different venue provisions, venue will lie where venue would
be proper for the principal claim.393 Furthermore, a permissive venue
statute must yield to a mandatory venue provision. 394 The court interpreted
Section 38-3-1(G) as a mandatory venue statute that controls as to every
action brought against state officials.395 Thus, joinder of the several claims
in UNC's complaint, in the interest of judicial economy, required the suit
be brought in Santa Fe County.3 6
D. Cost of Appeal
In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Corporation Commission,397
the supreme court held that the court, not the Corporation Commission,
had the authority to determine who should bear the cost of preparing the
appellate record on appeal.3 98 The Commission had assessed the cost to
the appellants. 399 Appellants objected to the assessment, arguing, inter
alia, that the cost was unwarranted.' Appellants pointed out that the
389. Id. at 758, 700 P.2d at 1007. UNC had sued in district court in McKinley County. The
district court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that venue was improper and the Division action
did not constitute a "licensing action." Thus, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction. See supra
text accompanying note 357.
390. N.M. STAT. ANN. §38-3-1(G) (Cum. Supp. 1984) since amended by 1988 N.M. Laws, ch.
8 § 1; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-3-1(G) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
391. United Nuclear, 102 N.M. at 761, 700 P.2d at 1010.
392. N.M. STAT. ANN. §74-3-9(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
393. 102 N.M. at 761, 700 P.2d at 1010.
394. Id.
395. ld.
396. Id.
397. 105 N.M. 145, 730 P.2d 448 (1986).
398. Id. at 150-51, 730 P.2d at 453-54.
399. Id. at 150, 730 P.2d at 453. The Commission said its authority to assess the appellants lay
in Rule 64 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. The Commission did not include this regulation
in the record.
400. Id. The assessment was for $1,589.00.
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Commission is statutorily required to keep three copies of every transcript
of every proceeding. 4° The Commission incurs no additional cost when
a case is appealed by removal to the supreme court because it simply
hands over these transcripts to the court.4°2
The court held that in cases where a transcribed record is already
available on appeal, it, not the Commission, will determine who will
bear the cost on removal.40 3 In this case, it found that since the appellants
had prevailed on more claims than the Commission, it would be unfair
to shift the cost of an already prepared record to them.' The court stated
in its opinion that the Commission's assessment for costs it had already
paid had a "chilling effect" on appeals."° Nevertheless, it declined to
adopt any general rule prohibiting the shifting of this cost to appellants
in all cases.
V. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion of appellate cases decided from April 1,
1984, through January 31, 1988, shows, there were significant devel-
opments in each area of New Mexico administrative law during the survey
period. Several decided cases also underscore the fact that some areas of
New Mexico administrative law remain in need of clarification. In the
area of authority of agencies to act, the supreme court rejected the public/
private rights approach to determining the constitutionality of adjudicatory
power delegated to administrative agencies, but it did not announce an
alternative standard.' In a case involving a statute purporting to delegate
legislative power to private individuals, the court of appeals correctly
held the statute to be unconstitutional. In doing so however, the court
inappropriately used a test designed to prohibit unconstitutionally broad
delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies. The use of
this test threatens to hamper the appropriate adjudication of similar issues
in future cases. 4°7 Although the court of appeals and the supreme court
decided many cases during the survey period involving statutes which
had been interpreted by the agency designated to execute them, the courts
left us with no clear guidance as to when they will defer to an agency's
401. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 63-7-13 (1978) requires the Commission to keep a file of the evidence
and testimony, transcribed in triplicate, from each proceeding.
402. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 63-7-14 (1978) requires the clerk of the Commission to transmit to the
supreme court the file of the proceeding being appealed from.
403. Southern Pacific, 105 N.M. at 151,730 P.2d at 454.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 150, 730 P.2d at 453.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 8-35.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 36-57.
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interpretation.40" Finally, despite well intentioned judicial attempts at elu-
cidation, the now five-year-old "whole record review" test for reviewing
agency findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard remains
murky.
408. See supra text accompanying notes 82-120.
409. See supra text accompanying notes 333-52.
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